CVE-2026-83557: jackson-databind omits java.lang.Comparable from DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator's unsafe base types

Published Sep 1, 2026
·
Updated

Summary DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator — the PolymorphicTypeValidator used automatically whenever @JsonTypeInfo is applied without an explicitly configured custom validator — denies polymorphic resolution only for nine specific "unsafe base types" (Object, Serializable, Closeable, AutoCloseable, Cloneable, Runnable, java.util.logging.Handler, javax.naming.Referenceable, javax.sql.DataSource). Its isSafeSubType() returns true unconditionally for every other base type. java.lang.Comparable is not in that list, despite being implemented by a very large fraction of JDK and application classes — comparable in breadth to Serializable, which is denylisted for exactly that reason. An application with an @JsonTypeInfo-annotated Comparable-typed property, and no custom validator configured, will accept a type identifier for essentially any class implementing Comparable.

Details Affected file: src/main/java/tools/jackson/databind/jsontype/DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator.java

java private final static class UnsafeBaseTypes { private final Set<String> UNSAFE = new HashSet<>(); { UNSAFE.add(Object.class.getName()); UNSAFE.add(java.io.Closeable.class.getName()); UNSAFE.add(java.io.Serializable.class.getName()); UNSAFE.add(AutoCloseable.class.getName()); UNSAFE.add(Cloneable.class.getName()); UNSAFE.add(Runnable.class.getName()); // [databind#5014] UNSAFE.add("java.util.logging.Handler"); UNSAFE.add("javax.naming.Referenceable"); UNSAFE.add("javax.sql.DataSource"); // java.lang.Comparable is NOT present here } }

protected boolean isSafeSubType(DatabindContext ctxt, JavaType baseType, JavaType subType) { return true; // unconditional for every base type not in UNSAFE }

The class's own JavaDoc acknowledges the design ("Note that when using potentially unsafe base type like java.lang.Object a custom implementation... is needed"), so the trade-off of leaving broad base types unrestricted is intentional. The gap is that Comparable has the same breadth of implementers as the types this class does restrict, and its absence looks like an oversight rather than a deliberate choice — consistent with the ongoing, incremental nature of this list (Runnable was added recently for issue #5014).

This is specific to the default, unconfigured validator reached via bare @JsonTypeInfo usage. Global "Default Typing" via activateDefaultTyping() is not affected, because that method structurally requires an explicit PolymorphicTypeValidator argument — a correctly-configured BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator rejects the same payload under activateDefaultTyping().

PoC Built entirely from source (jackson-databind + jackson-core + jackson-annotations, javac, OpenJDK 21, no third-party gadget libraries, no network access):

1. Sanity check (benign class, confirms the mechanism fires): java static class SafeThing implements Comparable<SafeThing> { public String name; public SafeThing() {} public int compareTo(SafeThing o) { return 0; } } static class Holder { @JsonTypeInfo(use = JsonTypeInfo.Id.CLASS) public Comparable<?> value; }

ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder().build(); // no custom PTV String json = "{\"value\":{\"@class\":\"...SafeThing\",\"name\":\"hello\"}}"; Holder h = mapper.readValue(json, Holder.class); // RESULT: ACCEPTED, class=...SafeThing

2. Real JDK class substitution: java String json = "{\"value\":[\"java.io.File\",\"/etc/passwd\"]}"; Holder h = mapper.readValue(json, Holder.class); // RESULT: ACCEPTED, class=java.io.File value=/etc/passwd

3. Negative control — Default Typing with an explicit custom PTV: java PolymorphicTypeValidator ptv = BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.builder() .allowIfSubType("PtvGapTest4").build(); ObjectMapper mapper = JsonMapper.builder() .activateDefaultTyping(ptv, DefaultTyping.NONFINAL).build(); // same java.io.File payload // RESULT: REJECTED - InvalidTypeIdException: "...denied resolution"

Observed output:

$ java -cp .:build/classes PtvGapTest3 Trying: {"value":["java.io.File","/etc/passwd"]} ACCEPTED, class=java.io.File value=/etc/passwd

$ java -cp .:build/classes PtvGapTest4 Trying malicious substitution: ["PtvGapTest4$Holder",{"value":["java.io.File","/etc/passwd"]}] REJECTED - InvalidTypeIdException: Could not resolve type id 'java.io.File' as a subtype of java.lang.Comparable: Configured PolymorphicTypeValidator denied resolution

Impact Any application declaring an @JsonTypeInfo-annotated property or class with Comparable as its base type, without a separately configured restrictive PolymorphicTypeValidator, will accept a type identifier for essentially any class implementing Comparable. Concrete impact is demonstrated via java.io.File: an attacker can cause construction of a File object for an arbitrary, attacker-chosen path. On its own this is a controlled-object-instantiation primitive; if the application later calls path-sensitive or mutating methods on the received value, this becomes a path-traversal-adjacent primitive.

Suggested remediation: 1. Add java.lang.Comparable to UnsafeBaseTypes.UNSAFE. 2. Audit other broad JDK interfaces (java.lang.Iterable, java.util.EventListener) for the same gap. 3. Consider a narrower default for isSafeSubType() for base types outside the fixed denylist, rather than unconditional true.

Other sources

DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator is the PolymorphicTypeValidator applied automatically whenever @JsonTypeInfo is used without an explicitly configured custom validator. It denies polymorphic resolution only for a fixed set of "unsafe base types", and its isSafeSubType method returns true unconditionally for every base type outside that set. java.lang.Comparable was absent from the list despite being implemented by a very large fraction of JDK and application classes, comparable in breadth to java.io.Serializable, which is on the list for that reason. An application declaring an @JsonTypeInfo-annotated property or class with Comparable as its base type, and no custom PolymorphicTypeValidator, will accept a type identifier for essentially any class implementing Comparable. This yields an attacker-controlled object instantiation primitive; a demonstrated case constructs a java.io.File for an arbitrary attacker-chosen path, which becomes path-traversal-adjacent if the application subsequently calls path-sensitive methods on the value. No class implementing Comparable has been identified that yields code execution through deserialization alone. Global Default Typing via activateDefaultTyping is not affected, because that method structurally requires an explicit PolymorphicTypeValidator argument. This affects com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 2.11.0 before 2.18.10, from 2.19.0 before 2.21.6, and from 2.22.0 before 2.22.2, and tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind from 3.0.0 before 3.1.6 and from 3.2.0 before 3.2.2. Users should upgrade to 2.18.10, 2.21.6, 2.22.2, 3.1.6, or 3.2.2.

— MITRE

Affected Software

7 affected componentsFixes available
com.fasterxml.jackson.core jackson-databind>2.11.0<=2.18.10, >2.19.0<=2.21.6, >2.22.0<=2.22.2
tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind>3.0.0<=3.1.6, >3.2.0<=3.2.2
maven/com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind>=2.22.0<2.22.2
2.22.2
maven/com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind>=2.19.0<2.21.6
2.21.6
maven/com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind>=2.11.0<2.18.10
2.18.10
maven/tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind>=3.2.0<3.2.2
3.2.2
maven/tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind>=3.0.0<3.1.6
3.1.6

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade maven/com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.22.2
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade maven/com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.21.6
  3. Upgrade

    Upgrade maven/com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.18.10
  4. Upgrade

    Upgrade maven/tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 3.2.2
  5. Upgrade

    Upgrade maven/tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 3.1.6
  6. Upgrade

    Upgrade com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.18.10
  7. Upgrade

    Upgrade com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.21.6
  8. Upgrade

    Upgrade com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.22.2
  9. Upgrade

    Upgrade tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 3.1.6
  10. Upgrade

    Upgrade tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 3.2.2
  11. Configuration

    Configure an explicit restrictive PolymorphicTypeValidator, such as BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator with an allow-list of permitted subtypes, for applications that require polymorphic handling of Comparable-typed properties.

    Jackson PolymorphicTypeValidator Explicit PolymorphicTypeValidator for Comparable-typed polymorphic properties = BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator with an allow-list of permitted subtypes
  12. Compensating control

    Audit other broad JDK interfaces, including java.lang.Iterable and java.util.EventListener, for the same unsafe-base-type gap.

Event History

Sep 1, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·02:57 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·02:57 PM
RemedyDescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·03:17 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Sep 28, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·08:44 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·08:44 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which applications are exposed to this issue?

Applications are exposed when they declare an @JsonTypeInfo-annotated property or class whose base type is java.lang.Comparable and do not explicitly configure a custom PolymorphicTypeValidator. The automatically applied DefaultBaseTypeLimitingValidator otherwise permits subtype resolution for this base type.

2

What does an attacker need to exploit it?

An attacker needs to be able to supply a polymorphic type identifier to the affected deserialization path. No authentication or user interaction is indicated by the supplied vector, but exploitation has high attack complexity.

3

What can an attacker achieve through the demonstrated behavior?

The issue provides an attacker-controlled object-instantiation primitive for classes implementing Comparable. A demonstrated case creates a java.io.File with an attacker-chosen path; risk becomes path-traversal-adjacent if the application later invokes path-sensitive methods on that object.

4

Does this issue provide code execution through deserialization alone?

No Comparable-implementing class has been identified that produces code execution through deserialization alone. The stated impact is limited to attacker-controlled instantiation and any unsafe application behavior performed later on the resulting object.

5

How can teams identify potentially affected code?

Review deserialization models for @JsonTypeInfo on properties or classes using Comparable as the base type, and determine whether a custom PolymorphicTypeValidator is explicitly configured. Such uses relying on the automatic validator are the affected condition described here.

Contact

SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
132 Wickham Terrace
Fortitude Valley,
QLD 4006, Australia
info@secalerts.co
By using SecAlerts services, you agree to our services end-user license agreement. This website is safeguarded by reCAPTCHA and governed by the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service. All names, logos, and brands of products are owned by their respective owners, and any usage of these names, logos, and brands for identification purposes only does not imply endorsement. If you possess any content that requires removal, please get in touch with us.
© 2026 SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
ABN: 70 645 966 203, ACN: 645 966 203