CVE-2026-83614: xmldom: Quadratic-time parsing via the malformed-input recovery path — `parseElementStartPart` re-scan and `normalize()` adjacent-text merge
Summary
xmldom's malformed-input error-recovery path has two quadratic-time (O(n²)) behaviors that a single crafted input triggers together, so a tiny, highly compressible document (tens of KB) stalls the Node.js event loop for multiple seconds. It is reachable from DOMParser.parseFromString under default options — i.e. from unauthenticated, network-delivered XML — making this an unauthenticated denial of service. One of the two behaviors, the normalize() adjacent-text merge, is additionally reachable programmatically — via a plain normalize() call on a DOM built with adjacent text nodes, independent of the parser — so its fix must live in normalize(), not only in a parser bound.
Details
Finding A — parseElementStartPart quadratic re-scan
A < character is not a delimiter in any tag-parsing state, so parseElementStartPart scans forward character-by-character over any embedded < until it reaches the next > (or end of input), then validates the accumulated slice as a tag name and throws invalid tagName: on failure. The main loop catches this, reports an error, sets end = -1, and recovers by advancing a single character (appendText(Math.max(tagStart, start) + 1)). With a long run of < and a distant >, each of the O(n) recovery retries performs an O(n) scan plus an O(n) anchored regex validation over the growing candidate ⇒ O(n²).
Code (0.9.x, bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9):
- parseElementStartPart character scan — https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/sax.js#L263-L461 - tag-name validation (setTagName → throws invalid tagName) — https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/sax.js#L886-L891 - main-loop catch → error + end = -1 — https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/sax.js#L234-L242 - single-character recovery fallback — https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/sax.js#L247
Code (0.8.x, e5c14802592685bb872c042c54c3f73758875c85):
- parseElementStartPart — https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/e5c14802592685bb872c042c54c3f73758875c85/lib/sax.js#L227 - catch → error + end = -1 — https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/e5c14802592685bb872c042c54c3f73758875c85/lib/sax.js#L202-L208 - recovery fallback — https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/e5c14802592685bb872c042c54c3f73758875c85/lib/sax.js#L213 - setTagName validation — https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/e5c14802592685bb872c042c54c3f73758875c85/lib/sax.js#L616-L621
Finding B — normalize() adjacent-text O(K²) merge
endDocument() calls document.normalize(). For a parent with K adjacent text nodes (produced by the one-character recovery of Finding A), normalize() performs K−1 merges. Each merge does a removeChild — which re-indexes all child nodes of the parent (O(K)) — and an appendData — which rebuilds the accumulator string this.data + text (O(K)). Total: O(K²).
Well-formed XML cannot produce adjacent text-node siblings through the parser (each text run is one node; comments, CDATA, PIs, and elements sit between runs), so the parse-path trigger for Finding B is the malformed-input recovery that emits single-character text nodes. The same O(K²) merge is, however, independently reachable via the public normalize() API on a programmatically built tree (see "Finding B is additionally reachable programmatically" below).
Code (0.9.x, bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9):
- endDocument → normalize() — https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/dom-parser.js#L418-L420 - normalize() adjacent-text merge — https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/dom.js#L1336-L1356 - removeChild re-index-all branch — https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/dom.js#L1788-L1798 - appendData string rebuild — https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/bb7a085dc5ba1eea3212388509b97bb4b4af32b9/lib/dom.js#L2786-L2790
Code (0.8.x, e5c14802592685bb872c042c54c3f73758875c85):
- endDocument → normalize() — https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/e5c14802592685bb872c042c54c3f73758875c85/lib/dom-parser.js#L213-L214 - normalize() merge — https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/e5c14802592685bb872c042c54c3f73758875c85/lib/dom.js#L529-L549 - removeChild re-index-all branch — https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/e5c14802592685bb872c042c54c3f73758875c85/lib/dom.js#L756-L773 - appendData string rebuild — https://github.com/xmldom/xmldom/blob/e5c14802592685bb872c042c54c3f73758875c85/lib/dom.js#L1533
Finding B is additionally reachable programmatically (no parser involved)
Node.prototype.normalize() is public API on every Document/Element. A tree built entirely through the ordinary DOM API — new DOMImplementation().createDocument(...), then K× createTextNode + appendChild on one parent — reaches the same O(K²) merge when the application calls normalize(), with no parsing and no error-recovery. The parser is only one of the two callers of the vulnerable merge:
- the parser's automatic endDocument() → document.normalize() (the parse-path trigger above), and - any explicit application call to the public normalize() on a tree with adjacent text nodes.
XMLSerializer does not call normalize(), so serializing an un-merged tree is O(total text), not O(K²); the O(K²) surface is exactly those two normalize() callers. Consequently a parser-side bound alone cannot remediate Finding B — the fix must live in normalize().
Affected Versions
Both findings are present across the full published @xmldom/xmldom history — both currently-maintained versions (0.8.x and 0.9.x) are affected — and across the retired unscoped xmldom line. Finding B's normalize() merge is additionally reachable programmatically: a direct normalize() call on a DOM built with adjacent text nodes hits the same O(K²) merge, independent of the parser — so, unlike Finding A, it does not require the malformed-input recovery path.
Proof of Concept
Default DOMParser, no options. The input is trivially compressible (a< / a<> repeated) and never throws — it is parsed via the recovery path.
js const { DOMParser } = require('@xmldom/xmldom');
// Silence the expected error-level recovery reports (default handler logs // them to console.error without throwing; only fatalError throws). console.error = function () {};
function timeParse(label, xml, mime) { const t0 = process.hrtime.bigint(); new DOMParser().parseFromString(xml, mime); // completes; no exception const ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - t0) / 1e6; console.log(label + ' bytes=' + Buffer.byteLength(xml) + ' time=' + ms.toFixed(1) + ' ms'); }
for (const N of [4000, 8000, 16000, 32000]) { // Finding A: long re-scans, O(n^2) during parse. timeParse('A N=' + N, '<r>' + 'a<'.repeat(N) + '</r>', 'text/xml'); // Finding B: short re-scans (cheap parse) but K adjacent text nodes -> O(K^2) in normalize(). timeParse('B N=' + N, '<r>' + 'a<>'.repeat(N) + '</r>', 'text/html'); // Combined: ONE input hits both A and B under the default parser. timeParse('C N=' + N, '<r>' + 'a<'.repeat(N) + '</r>', 'text/xml'); }
Measured on Node v18.20.8 (absolute ms vary by host; the load-bearing fact is that doubling the input ~quadruples the time — canonical O(n²)):
Finding A, isolated ("<r>" + "a<"×N + "</r>", normalize disabled to isolate the re-scan):
| N | input bytes | @xmldom/xmldom 0.9.10 | 0.8.13 | |--:|--:|--:|--:| | 2000 | 4007 | 43 ms | 37 ms | | 4000 | 8007 | 129 ms | 106 ms | | 8000 | 16007 | 434 ms | 424 ms | | 16000 | 32007 | 1629 ms | 1611 ms |
Finding B, isolated ("<r>" + "a<>"×N + "</r>", time attributable to normalize()):
| K (N) | input bytes | 0.9.10 | 0.8.13 | |--:|--:|--:|--:| | 4000 | 12007 | 120 ms | 165 ms | | 8000 | 24007 | 589 ms | 771 ms | | 16000 | 48007 | 3142 ms | 4448 ms | | 32000 | 96007 | 12127 ms | 12951 ms |
Combined (default parser, both findings; "<r>" + "a<"×N + "</r>"):
| N | input bytes | 0.9.10 | 0.8.13 | |--:|--:|--:|--:| | 4000 | 8007 | 341 ms | 397 ms | | 8000 | 16007 | 1894 ms | 1641 ms | | 16000 | 32007 | 4398 ms | 7661 ms |
~32 KB of input → several seconds of single-threaded event-loop stall.
Finding B via the public normalize() API (no parser)
js const { DOMImplementation } = require('@xmldom/xmldom');
function timeNormalize(K) { const doc = new DOMImplementation().createDocument(null, 'r', null); const el = doc.documentElement; for (let i = 0; i < K; i++) el.appendChild(doc.createTextNode('x')); // K adjacent text nodes const t0 = process.hrtime.bigint(); doc.normalize(); // O(K^2) merge — no parsing involved const ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - t0) / 1e6; console.log('K=' + K + ' time=' + ms.toFixed(1) + ' ms'); } for (const K of [2000, 4000, 8000, 16000, 32000]) timeNormalize(K);
Measured on Node v18.20.8 (doubling K ~quadruples the time — O(K²)):
| K | 0.9.10 | 0.8.13 | |--:|--:|--:| | 2000 | 5.7 ms | 5.6 ms | | 32000 | 1263 ms | 1704 ms |
This path is reachable by any application that builds a DOM from attacker-influenced data and calls normalize(), entirely independent of DOMParser.
Impact
Availability only: a single parse of a small crafted document blocks the Node.js event loop for the duration of the quadratic work (multiple seconds at tens of KB; larger inputs scale as O(n²)). No memory blow-up beyond transient strings, no data exposure, no integrity impact. Because XML is routinely accepted from untrusted sources and parsed with default options, one request can stall a server. The payloads are highly compressible, so any endpoint accepting compressed XML faces additional amplification. Finding B is additionally reachable via an explicit normalize() call on a programmatically built DOM (see Proof of Concept), so applications that construct a document from attacker-influenced data and normalize it are exposed even without parsing.
Severity note
The complexity is quadratic, not exponential, so a multi-second stall requires tens-to-hundreds of KB of input. VA:H reflects that xmldom applies no input-size limit and the path runs on default-options parsing, so a single unbounded parse can fully stall the event loop.
Fix Applied
Two independent, non-breaking fixes shipped together — each alone leaves the other's quadratic cost dominating the default parse. Finding A — terminate the malformed tag-name scan at an embedded <, so error recovery is linear instead of O(n²). DOM output is unchanged; only the reported error-message text differs (error strings are not a semver contract). Finding B — merge adjacent text nodes in normalize() in O(K) instead of O(K²), which also closes the same slowdown reachable programmatically through a direct normalize() call. Both ship on both maintained versions.
Other sources
xmldom is a pure JavaScript W3C standard-based (XML DOM Level 2 Core) DOMParser and XMLSerializer module. Prior to @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12, and in xmldom versions 0.3.0 through 0.6.0, two independent quadratic paths can cause denial of service. In lib/sax.js, parseElementStartPart repeatedly rescans a malformed tag name to the next > during single-character recovery; in lib/dom.js, normalize() repeatedly removes and appends adjacent text nodes, causing quadratic reindexing and string rebuilding. The first path is reachable through default DOMParser.parseFromString() processing, while the second is also reachable through a direct normalize() call on a programmatically constructed DOM, and endDocument invokes that normalization after parsing. This issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom versions 0.8.15 and 0.9.12; no fixed version is available for xmldom.
— NVD
xmldom: Quadratic-time parsing via the malformed-input recovery path — parseElementStartPart re-scan and normalize() adjacent-text merge
— Microsoft
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/@xmldom/xmldomto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.9.12 - Upgrade
Upgrade
npm/@xmldom/xmldomto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.8.15 - Upgrade
Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.
Patch 8.15 - Upgrade
Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.
Patch 9.12
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Are applications using the parser with its default behavior exposed?
Yes. The malformed-tag-name recovery path is reachable through default DOMParser.parseFromString() processing, so applications that parse attacker-controlled XML can be exposed to denial of service.
What input or access does an attacker need?
An attacker needs a way to cause processing of malformed XML that triggers the parser's single-character recovery behavior. The separate normalization path can also be triggered by calling normalize() on a programmatically constructed DOM, and parsing invokes normalization through endDocument.
Which versions contain a fix?
The issue is fixed in @xmldom/xmldom 0.8.15 and 0.9.12. No fixed version is available for the xmldom package; affected @xmldom/xmldom versions are those before 0.8.15 and 0.9.12, while xmldom 0.3.0 through 0.6.0 is affected.