CVE-2026-83801: Nautobot: Stored cross-site scripting (XSS) in object create/edit form help text
Impact What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
It has two related instances that share the same root cause: a user-controlled model field is assigned verbatim to a form field's helptext, which is rendered with Django's |safe filter (renderfield.html), bypassing auto-escaping.
In both cases the script executes in the browser of any user who opens an affected create or edit form, including administrators and superusers. Because the payload runs in the victim's authenticated session, it can lead to actions performed as the victim, session/token theft, and further privilege escalation. Exploitation requires the victim to open an affected form.
Relationship description
A user who holds the add/change permission for Relationships (extras.addrelationship / extras.changerelationship) can set a Relationship's description to an HTML/JavaScript payload. That description is used as the help text of the relationship's form field and is rendered on the create/edit page of every object type the relationship applies to.
Module Family name
A user who holds the add/change permission for Module Families (dcim.addmodulefamily / dcim.changemodulefamily) can put a payload in a Module Family name, which is interpolated into the modulefamily field's help text on the Module "Install module" form for any module bay assigned to that family.
Patches Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
Fixes are available in Nautobot v2.4.37+ & v3.1.8+
Note: The underlying weakness exists in earlier EOL versions of Nautobot (v1.x). Users on those older EOL versions are highly encouraged to upgrade to a supported version.
Workarounds Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
There is no configuration-only fix. To remediate without upgrading:
- Restrict the extras.addrelationship / extras.changerelationship and dcim.addmodulefamily / dcim.changemodulefamily permissions to fully trusted administrators only. - Audit existing Relationship description values and Module Family name values for embedded HTML / <script> content and remove any payloads.
Note that limiting who can open create/edit forms does not fully mitigate the issue, since the payload targets any user (including admins) who opens an affected form.
Credit
Credit for this discovery goes to Habibullo Izzatilloyev.
Other sources
Nautobot is a Network Source of Truth and Network Automation Platform. Prior to 2.4.37 and 3.1.8, a user with extras.addrelationship or extras.changerelationship permission can store HTML or JavaScript in a Relationship description, and a user with dcim.addmodulefamily or dcim.changemodulefamily permission can store it in a Module Family name. Nautobot assigns these values to form field helptext rendered by renderfield.html through Django's |safe filter without adequate neutralization. The stored content executes in the authenticated browser session of any user, including an administrator or superuser, who opens an affected create or edit form. This can enable actions as the victim, session or token theft, and further privilege escalation. This issue is fixed in versions 2.4.37 and 3.1.8.
— MITRE
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
pip/nautobotto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 3.1.8 - Upgrade
Upgrade
pip/nautobotto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.4.37 - Upgrade
Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.
Fixed in 2.4.37 - Upgrade
Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.
Fixed in 3.1.8 - Configuration
Restrict these permissions to fully trusted administrators only.
Nautobot permissions extras.add_relationship, extras.change_relationship, dcim.add_modulefamily, dcim.change_modulefamily = Fully trusted administrators only - Operational
Audit existing Relationship description values and Module Family name values for embedded HTML or <script> content, and remove any payloads.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who can introduce the malicious stored content?
A user needs either extras.add_relationship or extras.change_relationship permission to place it in a Relationship description, or dcim.add_modulefamily or dcim.change_modulefamily permission to place it in a Module Family name.
Which users are exposed when the payload is triggered?
Any authenticated user who opens an affected create or edit form can execute the stored content in their browser. This includes administrators and superusers, so the impact depends on the privileges of the user viewing the form.
What attacker interaction is required to exploit this issue?
The attacker must have one of the specified Relationship or Module Family create/change permissions and must store HTML or JavaScript in the relevant field. A victim must then open an affected create or edit form; user interaction is required for execution.
Which versions contain the fix?
The issue is fixed in Nautobot versions 2.4.37 and 3.1.8. Versions prior to those releases are affected.