CVE-2026-84365: Hono: Incomplete fix for CVE-2026-39408: `toSSG()` still writes files outside the output directory

Published Sep 1, 2026
·
Updated

Hono is a Web application framework that provides support for any JavaScript runtime. From 4.12.12 until 4.13.5, the fix released for CVE-2026-39408 does not cover every traversal sequence, and toSSG() can still write files outside the configured output directory when a route parameter contains consecutive parent-directory segments. Static site generation builds each output path from the route path and values supplied through ssgParams, then verifies that the result stays inside the output directory using the same normalization routine that built the path. That routine does not fully collapse runs of consecutive parent-directory segments, allowing a path that the check accepts to resolve outside the output directory, and the check also treats output directories that differ in how they are rooted as equivalent. This arises when an application generates a static site from route parameter values it does not fully control, such as slugs from a CMS, API, or user submission. An untrusted ssgParams value can create or overwrite files elsewhere in the build environment and alter generated artifacts or deployment output. The vulnerability affects build-time static site generation only; request-time routing and applications with entirely developer-controlled ssgParams values are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 4.13.5.

Affected Software

1 affected component
Hono>=4.12.12<=4.13.5

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade Hono to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 4.13.5Patch CVE-2026-39408

Event History

Sep 1, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·08:26 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·08:26 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which deployments are exposed to this issue?

Only build-time static site generation using toSSG() is affected. Exposure exists where route parameters are populated through ssgParams values that are not fully controlled, such as slugs from a CMS, API, or user submissions.

2

What does an attacker need to exploit it?

An attacker needs a way to influence a value supplied through ssgParams for a route parameter. Consecutive parent-directory segments in that value can cause toSSG() to write outside the configured output directory.

3

What is the potential impact on the build environment?

A crafted parameter can create or overwrite files elsewhere in the build environment. This can alter generated artifacts or deployment output.

4

How can teams identify whether they are affected?

Review Hono versions from 4.12.12 until 4.13.5 and identify builds that call toSSG(). Prioritize builds where ssgParams values originate from CMS content, APIs, or user-controlled data.

Contact

SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
132 Wickham Terrace
Fortitude Valley,
QLD 4006, Australia
info@secalerts.co
By using SecAlerts services, you agree to our services end-user license agreement. This website is safeguarded by reCAPTCHA and governed by the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service. All names, logos, and brands of products are owned by their respective owners, and any usage of these names, logos, and brands for identification purposes only does not imply endorsement. If you possess any content that requires removal, please get in touch with us.
© 2026 SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
ABN: 70 645 966 203, ACN: 645 966 203