CVE-2026-84474: Automation-controller: automation-controller-container: automation-controller: view_jobtemplate to execute privilege escalation via host_config_key exposure and x-forwarded-for spoofing of provisioning-callback host match
A flaw was found in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform's automation- controller. The provisioning-callback secret (hostconfigkey) is exposed to users holding only the read-level viewjobtemplate permission -- both in the job template API representation and in the activity stream -- and the provisioning callback endpoint trusts a client-supplied X-Forwarded-For header to determine the calling host when the controller is deployed behind the AAP gateway with an empty proxy allow-list. By reading the secret and spoofing X-Forwarded-For to match any host in the job template's inventory, a minimally privileged or unauthenticated remote attacker can launch the job template against arbitrary managed hosts using the job template's credentials, resulting in privilege escalation and remote code execution on managed hosts.
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed to the callback-host spoofing portion of this issue?
Deployments of the controller behind the AAP gateway with an empty proxy allow-list are exposed, because the provisioning callback endpoint trusts the client-supplied X-Forwarded-For header to identify the calling host.
What access does an attacker need to launch jobs through this flaw?
A user with only the read-level view_jobtemplate permission can obtain the provisioning-callback secret from the job template API representation or activity stream. The issue description also identifies unauthenticated remote attackers as potentially able to launch a job template when the callback conditions can be satisfied.
What can an attacker do after obtaining the provisioning-callback secret?
They can spoof X-Forwarded-For to match a host in the job template inventory and launch the template against arbitrary managed hosts. The job runs using the template's credentials, which can result in privilege escalation and remote code execution on managed hosts.
Where can defenders look for exposure of the provisioning-callback secret?
The host_config_key is exposed in both the job template API representation and the activity stream to users with view_jobtemplate permission. Review access to that permission and exposure of those two interfaces.