CVE-2026-84502: Automation-controller: automation-controller-container: automation-controller: project scm_url argument injection into `git ls-remote --upload-pack` yields rce on the controller-task control-plane pod
A flaw was found in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform's automation- controller. The Project scmurl field is not validated against values that begin with a dash and is stored and passed verbatim to the git SCM module. Because the module runs git ls-remote with the URL as a positional argument and without a "--" separator, a git project URL such as "--upload-pack=<command>:x" is interpreted by git as the --upload-pack option and executed via a shell. A user with permission to create or modify a project in a single organization can thereby execute arbitrary commands on the control-plane task pod, with output reflected through the project update stdout endpoint, leading to cross-tenant compromise and in-cluster lateral movement
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who can exploit this issue?
A user who has permission to create or modify a Project within a single organization can exploit it. No user interaction is required.
What access does exploitation provide?
Successful exploitation allows arbitrary command execution on the controller-task control-plane pod. The issue can enable cross-tenant compromise and lateral movement within the cluster.
How can an administrator identify attempted or successful exploitation?
A malicious Project scm_url can begin with a dash and use a value such as "--upload-pack=<command>:x". Command output is reflected through the project update stdout endpoint, so review project configurations and update output for suspicious dash-prefixed SCM URLs or unexpected command output.
Is there a mitigation when patching cannot be performed immediately?
Restrict Project creation and modification permissions, particularly for users in individual organizations. Review existing Project scm_url values and remove or block values beginning with a dash.