CVE-2026-85231: Libtirpc: libtirpc: denial of service via unbounded memory allocation during rpcsec_gss decoding

Published May 18, 2026
·
Updated

A flaw was found in libtirpc. An authenticated remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending oversized wrapped data requests to an RPC (Remote Procedure Call) service configured with RPCSECGSS (Remote Procedure Call Security-Generic Security Service) integrity or privacy. This can lead to unbounded memory allocation, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) by exhausting system resources and causing the service to become unstable or terminate.

Other sources

AIONLYREPORT package: libtirpc-1.3.7-2.1.hum1 ------ Summary: Unbounded memory allocation during RPCSECGSS unwrap due to (uint)-1 maxsize: authenticated remote denial of service by forcing oversized pre-verification allocations in RPCSECGSS unwrap handling Requirements to exploit: The attacker must reach an RPC service linked against libtirpc-1.3.7-2.1.hum1, built with RPCSECGSS support, configured to use RPCSECGSSSVCINTEGRITY or RPCSECGSSSVCPRIVACY, establish a valid RPCSECGSS context, and send oversized wrapped RPCSECGSSDATA requests that the transport will accept. Component affected: libtirpc, src/authgssprot.c (xdrrpcgssunwrapdata(), xdrrpcgssbuf()), with attacker-driven allocation occurring in src/xdr.c (xdrbytes()) Version affected: libtirpc-1.3.7-2.1.hum1 when built with RPCSECGSS support and used by an RPC service that accepts RPCSECGSSSVCINTEGRITY or RPCSECGSSSVCPRIVACY traffic Patch available: no released package fix established; proposed patch included below Version fixed: unknown Upstream coordination: Notified privately. CVSS: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H - 6.5 (MEDIUM) AV:N - The attack is carried out over the network against a reachable RPC service. AC:L - Once a valid RPCSECGSS context exists, the attacker only needs to send oversized wrapped blobs with attacker-chosen length fields. PR:L - A valid RPCSECGSS context is required; the issue is not reachable as an anonymous network attack. UI:N - No user interaction is required. S:U - The impact is confined to the vulnerable service process. C:N - No confidentiality impact is demonstrated by the available evidence. I:N - No integrity impact is demonstrated by the available evidence. A:H - Repeated oversized allocations can exhaust memory and destabilize or terminate the service. Impact: Moderate. The established impact is denial of service in a network-facing path, but exploitation is conditional on RPCSECGSS being enabled in integrity or privacy mode, the attacker first establishing a valid RPCSECGSS context, and the deployment allowing sufficiently large wrapped requests to reach the decode path. This is a real availability issue, but the configuration and authentication preconditions make it less straightforward than the remote DoS cases typically rated Important. Embargo: no Reason: The available evidence supports an authenticated, configuration-dependent denial of service only. No code execution, confidentiality impact, or integrity impact is demonstrated, so normal coordinated remediation appears proportionate. Acknowledgement: Aisle Research Vulnerability Details: In xdrrpcgssunwrapdata(), the integrity and privacy paths decode attacker-controlled wrapped buffers using xdrrpcgssbuf(..., (uint)-1). xdrrpcgssbuf() forwards that value to xdrbytes(). During XDRDECODE, xdrbytes() reads the incoming length and allocates memalloc(nodesize) when the destination pointer is NULL. Because maxsize is effectively unbounded in this path, allocation can occur before gssverifymic() or gssunwrap() rejects the wrapped message. Focused excerpts from src/authgssprot.c: c if (!xdrrpcgssbuf(xdrs, &databuf, (uint)-1)) { LIBTIRPCDEBUG(1, ("xdrrpcgssunwrapdata: decode databodyinteg failed")); return (FALSE); } if (!xdrrpcgssbuf(xdrs, &wrapbuf, (uint)-1)) { gssreleasebuffer(&minstat, &databuf); LIBTIRPCDEBUG(1, ("xdrrpcgssunwrapdata: decode checksum failed")); return (FALSE); } ... if (!xdrrpcgssbuf(xdrs, &wrapbuf, (uint)-1)) { LIBTIRPCDEBUG(1, ("xdrrpcgssunwrapdata: decode databodypriv failed")); return (FALSE); } Focused excerpts from src/xdr.c: c if (! xdruint(xdrs, sizep)) { return (FALSE); } nodesize = sizep; if ((nodesize > maxsize) && (xdrs->xop != XDRFREE)) { return (FALSE); } ... if (sp == NULL) { cpp = sp = memalloc(nodesize); allocated = TRUE; } The available evidence supports a denial-of-service outcome through memory pressure or process termination under pressure. The exact amount allocable per request still depends on transport delivery, deployment-specific limits, and concurrency, and this report does not assert confidentiality or integrity impact. This report also only asserts the issue in the reviewed SRPM package. Steps to reproduce: 1. Build or deploy an RPC service linked against libtirpc-1.3.7-2.1.hum1 with RPCSECGSS support enabled and configured to use RPCSECGSSSVCINTEGRITY or RPCSECGSSSVCPRIVACY. 2. Establish a valid RPCSECGSS security context against the service. 3. Send RPCSECGSSDATA requests whose wrapped body length fields are very large but still deliverable over the transport in use. 4. Observe memory allocation in xdrbytes() during xdrrpcgssunwrapdata() before gssverifymic() or gssunwrap() completes verification. 5. Repeat the request or send several such requests concurrently to drive RSS growth, memory pressure, service degradation, or process termination. Mitigation: Until a fix is available, reduce exposure by disabling RPCSECGSS integrity/privacy on externally reachable services where feasible, enforcing strict request or transport record size limits in the embedding RPC service before wrapped blob decode, and using process memory limits or supervision to contain single-process exhaustion. Proposed Fix: A minimal mitigation is to replace the (uint)-1 decode bound with a fixed upper limit so oversized wrapped blobs are rejected before allocation. A stronger follow-up would derive the limit from negotiated context or transport limits, such as rpcgsssvcmaxdatalength(), instead of using a constant cap. diff diff --git a/src/authgssprot.c b/src/authgssprot.c — a/src/authgssprot.c +++ b/src/authgssprot.c @@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ / additional space needed for encoding / #define RPCSLACKSPACE 1024 +/ hard upper bound to prevent pre-verification memory exhaustion / +#define RPCSECGSSMAXUNWRAP (16U 1024U 1024U) + boolt xdrrpcgssunwrapdata(XDR xdrs, xdrproct xdrfunc, caddrt xdrptr, gssctxidt ctx, gssqopt qop, @@ -227,12 +230,12 @@ xdrrpcgssunwrapdata(...) if (svc == RPCSECGSSSVCINTEGRITY) { / Decode databodyinteg. / if (!xdrrpcgssbuf(xdrs, &databuf, (uint)-1)) { + if (!xdrrpcgssbuf(xdrs, &databuf, RPCSECGSSMAXUNWRAP)) { return (FALSE); } / Decode checksum. /

if (!xdrrpcgssbuf(xdrs, &wrapbuf, (uint)-1)) { + if (!xdrrpcgssbuf(xdrs, &wrapbuf, RPCSECGSSMAXUNWRAP)) { gssreleasebuffer(&minstat, &databuf); return (FALSE); } @@ -251,7 +254,7 @@ xdrrpcgssunwrapdata(...) } else if (svc == RPCSECGSSSVCPRIVACY) { / Decode databodypriv. /

if (!xdrrpcgssbuf(xdrs, &wrapbuf, (uint)-1)) { + if (!xdrrpcgssbuf(xdrs, &wrapbuf, RPCSECGSSMAXUNWRAP)) { return (FALSE); }

------ This report was generated using AI technology. Always review AI-generated content prior to use

— Red Hat

Affected Software

20 affected components
libtirpc libtirpc=1.3.7-2.1.hum1
ubuntu/libtirpc*
ubuntu/libtirpc*
ubuntu/ntirpc*
ubuntu/libtirpc*
ubuntu/ntirpc*
ubuntu/libtirpc*
ubuntu/ntirpc*
ubuntu/libtirpc*
ubuntu/ntirpc*
ubuntu/libtirpc*
ubuntu/ntirpc*
ubuntu/libtirpc*
ubuntu/ntirpc*
ubuntu/libtirpc*
ubuntu/ntirpc*
debian/libtirpc*
debian/libtirpc*
debian/libtirpc*
debian/libtirpc<=1.3.3+ds-1, <=1.3.6+ds-1, <=1.3.7+ds-1

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Configuration

    Disable RPCSEC_GSS on externally reachable RPC services, particularly RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY and RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY, until a fix is available.

    RPC service RPCSEC_GSS integrity/privacy = disabled
  2. Compensating control

    Apply the proposed libtirpc source mitigation in src/authgss_prot.c: define RPCSEC_GSS_MAX_UNWRAP as (16U * 1024U * 1024U) and pass it to xdr_rpc_gss_buf() for both databuf and wrapbuf, so oversized wrapped blobs are rejected before verification.

  3. Compensating control

    Enforce strict request or transport record size limits, along with limits on concurrency and process memory, to contain oversized RPCSEC_GSS requests and single-process exhaustion.

Event History

May 18, 2026
Data Sourced
via Red Hat·03:37 AM
DescriptionSeverityAffected Software
Oct 16, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·06:20 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·06:20 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via OSV·07:17 PM
DescriptionSeverityAffected Software
Data Sourced
via NVD·07:17 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which deployments are exposed to this denial-of-service issue?

Exposure requires an RPC service linked against libtirpc-1.3.7-2.1.hum1 with RPCSEC_GSS support enabled and configured to use RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_INTEGRITY or RPCSEC_GSS_SVC_PRIVACY. Services not using those RPCSEC_GSS protection modes are not identified as affected by the provided information.

2

What access does an attacker need to trigger the issue?

The attacker must be able to reach the RPC service remotely, establish a valid RPCSEC_GSS context, and have low-privileged authenticated access. They then send oversized wrapped RPCSEC_GSS_DATA requests that the transport accepts.

3

What is the operational impact of successful exploitation?

Oversized wrapped requests can cause unbounded memory allocation before verification of the data. This may exhaust system resources, making the RPC service unstable or causing it to terminate.

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