CVE-2026-85300: Apache Camel: Camel-PQC Private Key Disclosure via Key Material Written with Default File Permissions
Incorrect Default Permissions vulnerability in Apache Camel PQC component.
This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.12.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1.
When the component wrote generated key material to disk it did so with the permissions the process default umask produced, rather than restricting the file to its owner. On a host whose umask allows group or world read, the private key was therefore readable by other local accounts. The exposure is to a local party rather than to the remote sender that the Camel threat model treats as the primary adversary, which is why the severity is assessed low, but the consequence where it applies is complete: possession of the private key defeats every signature and key exchange the deployment performs with it.
Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. Users on the 4.22.x LTS releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. Key material is now written with owner-only permissions. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, place the key directory on a path only the service account can traverse, and tighten the process umask. Key material already written with permissive permissions should be treated as exposed and rotated.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
Apache Camelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 4.23.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
Apache Camelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 4.18.5 - Upgrade
Upgrade
Apache Camelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 4.22.1 - Configuration
Tighten the process umask so generated private key files are restricted to the owner.
Apache Camel PQC process umask = owner-only permissions - Compensating control
For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, place the key directory on a path only the service account can traverse.
- Operational
Treat key material already written with permissive permissions as exposed and rotate it.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who can access the exposed key material?
The exposure is to other local accounts on the host, not to a remote sender. It applies when the host's process umask permits group or world read access to generated key files.
What would an attacker need to exploit this issue?
An attacker needs local access to the host and sufficient filesystem access to read the generated private-key file. Possession of the private key defeats the signatures and key exchanges performed with that key.
Are all deployments using the affected releases exposed by default?
No. Exposure depends on the permissions produced by the service process's default umask. Deployments whose umask restricts the files to the owner do not have the described group or world-readable key-file exposure.
What can be done before upgrading?
Place the key directory on a path that only the service account can traverse, and tighten the process umask. Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, or to 4.18.5 for the 4.18.x LTS stream or 4.22.1 for the 4.22.x LTS stream.