CVE-2026-86061: Teable: child-resource lookups permit cross-tenant data access and modification
Teable is an AI spreadsheet for business. Prior to release.2026-07-17T05-20-38Z.2264, the routes for PluginService::regenerateSecret and PluginService::delete carry no @Permissions decorator, and the methods omit plugin ownership checks. An authenticated attacker can directly target another plugin's identifier to rotate and disclose its OAuth secret or delete the plugin, including system plugins. Separately, PermissionGuard authorizes several nested API requests using a caller-controlled parent tableId, baseId, or spaceId, while the services resolve the requested child object only by its globally unique identifier. An authenticated attacker can provide a parent resource the attacker owns together with a victim's child identifier. ViewService::getViewById can then disclose another tenant's view configuration, embedded filter values, field layout, and shareId. DashboardService::updatePluginStorage and the view-position updatePluginStorage path can overwrite another tenant's plugin storage because the plugin installation is not rebound to the authorized base, dashboard, table, or view. This issue is fixed in release.2026-07-17T05-20-38Z.2264.
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
Teableto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in release.2026-07-17T05-20-38Z.2264
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who can exploit this issue?
An authenticated attacker can exploit it. The attacker needs identifiers for victim child resources or plugins and, for the nested API flaws, access to a parent table, base, or space that they own.
Are system plugins affected?
Yes. The plugin secret regeneration and deletion routes can be targeted using another plugin's identifier, including identifiers for system plugins.
What data or actions are exposed?
An attacker may rotate and disclose a victim plugin's OAuth secret or delete its plugin. They may also read another tenant's view configuration, embedded filter values, field layout, and shareId, or overwrite plugin storage associated with another tenant.
How can I determine whether my deployment is affected?
Deployments running a version prior to release.2026-07-17T05-20-38Z.2264 are affected. Review access and audit records, where available, for plugin secret regeneration or deletion and for nested requests that reference child identifiers belonging to a different tenant.
What should be done if immediate patching is not possible?
Restrict access for untrusted authenticated users where possible, since exploitation requires authentication. Treat plugin OAuth secrets as potentially exposed and rotate them, especially if you cannot rule out unauthorized secret-regeneration requests.