CVE-2026-86089: Apache NiFi: Missing Process Group Authorization for Connector Migration
Apache NiFi 2.11.0 supports migrating the contents of a version-controlled Process Group into a Connector using REST API methods that list eligible migration sources and submit migration requests. The framework authorized both methods against the target Connector alone, without evaluating access to the Process Groups involved. The absence of Process Group authorization allowed an authenticated user with read access to a Connector to enumerate the identifiers, names, and flow registry details of version-controlled Process Groups outside the scope of granted read policies. It also allowed a user with write access to a Connector to migrate a Process Group without write access to that Process Group, copying the flow definition, referenced assets, and component state into the Connector, and leaving the source Process Group disabled and renamed. Migration excludes sensitive property values and requires the source Process Group to be stopped with empty queues, which limits the scope of exposure. Apache NiFi installations that do not implement component-level authorization policies for Process Groups are not subject to this vulnerability, because the framework enforces Connector write permissions as the security boundary. Upgrading to Apache NiFi 2.12.0 is the recommended mitigation, which filters migration sources to Process Groups the requesting user is authorized to read, and requires write access to the source Process Group when submitting a migration request.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
Apache NiFito a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.12.0Patch CVE-2026-86089
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are affected?
Affected deployments use component-level authorization policies for Process Groups. Installations that do not implement those policies are not subject to this issue.
What access does an attacker need?
The attacker must be authenticated and have access to the target Connector. Connector read access can be used to enumerate details of version-controlled Process Groups, while Connector write access can be used to submit a migration without write access to the source Process Group.
What conditions must exist for an unauthorized migration to succeed?
The source Process Group must be version-controlled, stopped, and have empty queues. These requirements limit which Process Groups can be migrated.
What is exposed or changed by a successful attack?
Read-level abuse can reveal Process Group identifiers, names, and flow registry details outside the user's granted read policies. A successful migration copies the flow definition, referenced assets, and component state into the Connector; the source Process Group is disabled and renamed, while sensitive property values are excluded.
How can administrators identify a possible unauthorized migration?
Look for version-controlled Process Groups that were disabled and renamed, along with corresponding Connector migrations containing copied flow definitions, referenced assets, or component state. The migration source must have been stopped with empty queues at the time of migration.