CVE-2026-88005: Open WebUI: Users denied by the OAuth domain allowlist or role policy can still sign in via token exchange
Summary Open WebUI's OAuth token exchange endpoint issues a session for a provider access token without applying the email domain allowlist that the normal OAuth login callback enforces. An account whose email domain the login callback would refuse could still obtain a working session through this endpoint.
Preconditions - ENABLEOAUTHTOKENEXCHANGE=True. It is disabled by default, so a default deployment is not affected. - OAUTHALLOWEDDOMAINS set to something other than . Deployments without a domain allowlist are not affected. - A valid, unexpired access token on the configured provider. - An Open WebUI account already linked to that provider subject, or an account with a matching email when OAUTHMERGEACCOUNTSBYEMAIL is enabled. This endpoint never creates accounts, so a token for a subject with no existing account is rejected.
Impact An admin who narrows the domain allowlist expects users outside it to lose access at their next sign-in. The login callback does deny them. Token exchange kept issuing sessions, so a user whose domain was removed retained working access as their existing account at its existing role. The endpoint cannot create an account and cannot raise anyone's role, so this grants continued access rather than new or elevated access.
Fix fb5ef978b, released in 0.9.0, adds the same domain allowlist check to the token exchange endpoint that the login callback runs, and denies the exchange with 403 when the email domain is not allowed. Upgrading restores the check with no further action.
Root cause The affected component is the OAuth token exchange endpoint in backend/openwebui/routers/auths.py, present in builds from 0.8.0 onward.
The endpoint was added as a second entry point into the same session-issuing path the OAuth login callback uses, but it re-implemented only the identity lookup and not the policy checks surrounding it. The domain allowlist check lived inside the callback's own body rather than in shared code, so the second caller inherited none of it.
Credits @Classic298
Other sources
Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. From 0.8.0 until 0.9.0, Open WebUI's OAuth token exchange endpoint issues a session for a provider access token without applying the email domain allowlist that the normal OAuth login callback enforces. An account whose email domain the login callback would refuse could still obtain a working session through this endpoint. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.0.
— MITRE
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
pip/open-webuito a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.9.0 - Upgrade
Upgrade
Open WebUIto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.9.0Patch fb5ef978b
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed?
Open WebUI versions from 0.8.0 up to, but not including, 0.9.0 are affected when OAuth is used and an email domain allowlist is intended to restrict access.
What does an attacker need to exploit this issue?
An attacker needs a provider access token for an account whose email domain would be denied by the normal OAuth login callback. They can use the OAuth token exchange endpoint to obtain a working session without the domain allowlist being applied.
Are role-policy restrictions also bypassed?
The supplied details identify the email domain allowlist as the control omitted by the token exchange endpoint. They do not provide technical detail on how any role policy is evaluated or bypassed.
How can I remediate the issue?
Upgrade Open WebUI to version 0.9.0, which fixes the issue.