CVE-2026-89422: TLS 1.3 client skips server authentication when ServerHello carries an unsolicited pre_shared_key extension
Key Exchange without Entity Authentication vulnerability in Erlang/OTP ssl allows a peer that answers a TLS 1.3 client connection to impersonate the intended server. A presharedkey extension in the ServerHello that the client never offered causes the client to complete the handshake without validating the server's certificate, so ssl:connect returns {ok, Socket} against a peer holding no certificate, no private key and no prior session.
tlsclientconnection13:handleserverhello/2 passes the received extension to tlsgenconnection13:handleresumption/2, which sets resumption = true on its mere presence without checking that the client offered a PSK. tlshandshake13:getpresharedkey/4 meanwhile falls back to the all-zero "no PSK" value and keys the handshake with the ordinary non-PSK schedule, so the attacker's own ephemeral key suffices. The resumption flag then routes mayberesumption/1 straight to waitfinished, skipping the certificate-handling states, so certificate path validation, verifyfun, hostname verification, partialchain, CRL checking and OCSP stapling are all bypassed. The default client configuration is affected; clients restricted to TLS 1.2 are not.
This issue affects OTP from OTP 22.2 before OTP 27.3.4.18, OTP 28.5.0.7, and OTP 29.1.1, corresponding to ssl from 9.5 before 11.2.12.13, 11.6.0.6, and 11.7.7.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
Erlang/OTPto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 27.3.4.18 - Upgrade
Upgrade
Erlang/OTPto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 28.5.0.7 - Upgrade
Upgrade
Erlang/OTPto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 29.1.1 - Configuration
Restrict clients to TLS 1.2 as a mitigation; clients restricted to TLS 1.2 are not affected.
Erlang/OTP ssl client TLS protocol version = TLS 1.2
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Are clients using the default configuration exposed?
Yes. The default Erlang/OTP ssl client configuration is affected when it negotiates TLS 1.3. Clients restricted to TLS 1.2 are not affected.
What does an attacker need to exploit this?
The attacker must be able to answer the TLS 1.3 client connection as the purported server and include an unsolicited pre_shared_key extension in ServerHello. They do not need a server certificate, its private key, or a prior TLS session with the client.
Which certificate and identity checks are bypassed?
The affected handshake skips certificate handling entirely. This bypasses certificate path validation, verify_fun, hostname verification, partial_chain, CRL checking, and OCSP stapling.
What can be done if patching is not immediately possible?
Restrict affected clients to TLS 1.2 so they cannot negotiate the vulnerable TLS 1.3 path.