CVE-2026-89497: orangefs: skip leading spaces before parsing client debug masks
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
orangefs: skip leading spaces before parsing client debug masks
orangefspreparecdmarray() sizes each client debug keyword buffer with strcspn(cdshead, " "), but then parses the keyword with %s. The %s conversion skips leading whitespace, while strcspn() does not.
If a client debug entry starts with a space, the allocation can be sized for an empty keyword while sscanf() copies the following non-empty token. This can write past the end of the allocated keyword buffer.
Skip leading spaces before computing the keyword length so the allocation matches the string parsed by sscanf().
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Configuration
In orangefs_prepare_cdm_array(), skip leading spaces before sizing the client debug keyword buffer and before parsing the keyword with %s, rather than using strcspn(cds_head, " ") on the untrimmed string.
Linux kernel (orangefs) orangefs_prepare_cdm_array() client debug mask keyword parsing = Skip leading spaces before computing keyword length and allocating/parsing buffer using %s
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
How can I identify configurations that may trigger the issue?
Inspect client debug mask entries for leading spaces before a debug keyword. An entry beginning with whitespace can cause the parser to allocate a buffer based on an empty token and then copy the following keyword into it.
What can be done if the kernel fix cannot be deployed immediately?
Remove leading whitespace from client debug mask entries so that each debug keyword starts at the beginning of its entry. This prevents the allocation and parsing behavior from disagreeing on the keyword length.
Is an upstream remediation available?
Yes. The supplied references include stable kernel commits that implement the parsing correction. The provided data does not map those commits to specific kernel release versions.