CVE-2026-89630: smb: client: restore the data_offset bound in is_valid_oplock_break()

Published Sep 11, 2026
·
Updated

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: restore the dataoffset bound in isvalidoplockbreak()

Commit 83bfbd0bb902 ("cifs: Remove the RFC1002 header from smbhdr") changed the quantity this bound is measured against. It used to be srv->totalread minus the 4-byte RFC1002 preamble that totalread then included, so it was the SMB message length. The same commit stopped counting the preamble, and the mechanical substitution to srv->totalread - srv->pdusize left an expression that is identically zero: standardreceive3() reads MIDHEADERSIZE() bytes and then exactly pdulength - MIDHEADERSIZE() more, adding both to totalread.

len is therefore 0, the subtraction below it wraps, and no u32 DataOffset can exceed the result, so the check from commit 097f5863b1a0 ("cifs: read overflow in isvalidoplockbreak()") no longer rejects anything. Use totalread, which is now the message length on its own.

Event History

Sep 11, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·07:45 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·07:45 PM
Description

Frequently Asked Questions

1

What systems are exposed to this issue?

Systems using the Linux kernel SMB client are exposed when they process SMB oplock break messages. The affected validation is in the client-side is_valid_oplock_break() path.

2

What must an attacker be able to do to reach the vulnerable code?

An attacker would need to cause the SMB client to receive a crafted oplock break message with a DataOffset value. The provided data does not establish whether authentication, a malicious SMB server, or network position is required.

3

How can I determine whether the validation fix is present?

Check whether the kernel includes either referenced stable commit: 5b16a1967a01ad4496a7206a87c3eb16f1df2b05 or ba22f575de9deeae4ae0859ca4315a7698226237. The corrected code uses total_read as the message-length bound rather than subtracting pdu_size from total_read.

4

What is the immediate mitigation if the kernel cannot be updated?

The supplied information does not provide a configuration workaround. Reducing exposure to untrusted SMB servers or SMB traffic can limit opportunities to deliver crafted client-directed SMB messages.

Contact

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