CVE-2026-91777: jackson-databind: quadratic forward-reference completion in Collection and Map deserializers
Forward-reference completion for @JsonIdentityInfo object IDs in FasterXML jackson-databind performs a linear scan of the pending-reference accumulator for every resolved ID. The affected paths are CollectionDeserializer.CollectionReferringAccumulator.resolveForwardReference() and the equivalent implementation in MapDeserializer. When a document first creates N unresolved object-ID references in an identity-enabled collection or map and then defines those same IDs in reverse order, completion performs on the order of N (N + 1) / 2 identity comparisons, so a shallow document whose size grows linearly causes quadratic CPU work during deserialization. The reporter instrumented equals() calls on the ID class and measured exactly 2,003,000 comparisons at N = 2,000, against zero comparisons in the pending-reference lookup path for an equally sized control in which every reference was already resolved. The input requires no deep nesting and no syntactically unusual JSON. Exploitation requires an application that deserializes attacker-influenced JSON into an identity-enabled collection or map. The fix replaces the repeated linear lookup with a keyed pending-reference structure.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
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com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databindto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.18.11 - Upgrade
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com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databindto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.21.7 - Upgrade
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com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databindto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 2.22.3 - Upgrade
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tools.jackson.core:jackson-databindto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 3.1.7 - Upgrade
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tools.jackson.core:jackson-databindto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 3.2.3
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which applications are exposed to this denial-of-service condition?
Applications are exposed if they deserialize attacker-influenced JSON into a collection or map that uses @JsonIdentityInfo object IDs. The vulnerable paths are the collection and map deserializers' handling of unresolved forward references.
What does an attacker need to send to trigger excessive CPU use?
The attacker needs to provide JSON that creates many unresolved object-ID references and then defines those IDs in reverse order. The payload does not require deep nesting or unusual JSON syntax, and no authentication or user interaction is required according to the supplied vector.
How can we determine whether a workload is being targeted or affected?
Look for attacker-controlled deserialization into identity-enabled collections or maps and for requests containing many forward object-ID references followed by reverse-order definitions. Such inputs can cause disproportionately high CPU consumption during deserialization despite growing only linearly in document size.