CVE-2026-92615: Flightctl: flightctl: package-global go-git https transport mutated per-repo -- cross-tenant tls-config bleed
A flaw was found in flightctl. The configureRepoHTTPSClient() function in the device-render worker builds a per-repository tls.Config (which may include InsecureSkipVerify, a custom CA bundle, or tenant-supplied mTLS client certificates) and installs it into go-git's process-global client.Protocols map via gitclient.InstallProtocol("https", ...). Because the worker renders devices for multiple organizations concurrently from a shared goroutine pool, whichever tenant's repository configuration is written last wins for all in-flight git.Clone calls. This race condition can cause one tenant's TLS settings, including InsecureSkipVerify or mTLS client credentials, to leak into another tenant's git operations.
Other sources
F002 from Project Glasswing AI-SAST audit of flightctl. Agent executes arbitrary container images from spec without signature or allowlist verification. Source: flightctl-security-audit.md#FIND-002. CVSS: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (8.8). Triage verdict: exploitable.
— Red Hat
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are most exposed to the TLS configuration bleed?
The described exposure is in device-render workers that process repositories for multiple organizations concurrently from a shared goroutine pool. Repositories using per-repository TLS settings, such as disabled certificate verification, custom CA bundles, or tenant-provided mTLS certificates, are specifically implicated.
What conditions lead to one tenant's TLS settings being used for another tenant's Git operation?
The condition occurs when concurrent repository rendering causes configureRepoHTTPSClient() to overwrite go-git's process-global HTTPS protocol client. The last repository configuration written can then be used by other in-flight git.Clone calls.
Are default TLS configurations confirmed to be affected?
The provided data identifies repositories with customized TLS configuration as the affected scenario. It does not state whether deployments using only default TLS settings are affected.
What attacker access and complexity should be assumed during triage?
The supplied severity block rates the issue as network-accessible with high attack complexity and high privileges required. However, the description also includes a different CVSS vector rating it as low complexity with low privileges required, so the access assumptions are inconsistent and should be validated before relying on either rating.