CVE-2026-92701: Cocos AI: Intra-handshake attested TLS implementation is vulnerable to session-misbinding attacks for Intel TDX verifier path

Published Sep 18, 2026
·
Updated

trusted execution environments. In versions up to and including 0.8.2, the intra-handshake attested TLS (aTLS) Intel TDX verification path does not copy the expected current-session freshness value into the TDX quote-body policy before quote validation, so structurally valid TDX QuoteV4 Evidence is accepted without checking that its REPORTDATA field matches the reportData expected for the current session. A relying party using this path can therefore accept Evidence with a mismatched or reused reportData and release application data after the handshake, enabling session-misbinding to an unintended attestation context. The issue is fixed in version 0.9.0.

Affected Software

1 affected component
Cocos AI Intra-handshake attested TLS (aTLS) Intel TDX verification path<=0.8.2

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade Cocos AI (intra-handshake attested TLS for Intel TDX verifier path) to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 0.9.0

Event History

Sep 18, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·05:06 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·05:06 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which deployments are exposed?

Deployments using the Cocos AI intra-handshake aTLS Intel TDX verification path are affected if they run version 0.8.2 or earlier. The issue is specific to the Intel TDX verifier path described; the provided information does not establish impact on other attestation paths.

2

What must an attacker provide to exploit this issue?

An attacker needs to provide structurally valid TDX QuoteV4 Evidence whose REPORT_DATA does not match the reportData expected for the current session. Because the freshness value is not incorporated into quote-body policy validation, reused or mismatched reportData can be accepted.

3

What is the practical security impact?

A relying party can release application data after the handshake while accepting Evidence bound to an unintended attestation context. This enables session-misbinding attacks.

4

How can I remediate the issue?

Upgrade to Cocos AI version 0.9.0, which fixes the issue. The supplied information does not describe a workaround for affected versions.

Contact

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