CVE-2026-93657: hickory-resolver before 0.26.2 DNSSEC Validation Bypass
hickory-resolver versions before 0.26.2 fail to propagate bogus DNSSEC proof states through the Resolver::lookup() and Resolver::lookupip() APIs, allowing invalid records to be returned as successful results. Attackers controlling the answering zone or positioned on the network path can have forged DNS records accepted as validated, bypassing DNSSEC authentication checks.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
hickory-resolverto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 0.26.2 - Compensating control
If you cannot immediately upgrade, reduce the likelihood of forged/poisoned DNS answers by limiting network-path access (e.g., ensure DNS traffic is not observable/modifiable by attackers and restrict who can reach the resolver from the network).
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which resolver calls are affected?
The validation bypass affects applications using the Resolver::lookup() and Resolver::lookup_ip() APIs, where bogus DNSSEC proof states are not propagated and invalid records can be returned as successful results.
What access does an attacker need to exploit this?
An attacker must be able to control the answering DNS zone or be positioned on the network path. No privileges or user interaction are required according to the supplied severity vector.
Which versions need remediation?
hickory-resolver versions before 0.26.2 are affected. Upgrading to 0.26.2 or later addresses the affected version range.