CVE-2026-93666: Bluetooth Classic SDP client can deadlock the Bluetooth workqueue on buffer allocation

Published Nov 16, 2026
·
Updated

The Bluetooth Classic SDP client built its outgoing request PDUs with btsdpcreatepdu(), which allocates from the sdppool net-buf pool with a KFOREVER timeout and no failure handling, in sdpclientsssearch(), sdpclientsasearch() and sdpclientssasearch() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/sdp.c. All of these run on the Bluetooth workqueue btworkq (via sdpclientworkhandler(), the L2CAP sdpclientconnected() callback, or the continuation-state follow-up from a received response), which is the same single thread that dispatches incoming HCI ACL and event traffic, drives L2CAP, and performs connection and channel teardown. sdppool holds only CONFIGBTMAXCONN buffers (one by default) and is shared with the SDP server role.

An unauthenticated peer within BR/EDR range can drive both halves of the trigger. The SDP L2CAP server is registered at BTSECURITYL0, so any inbound SDP request makes the device allocate the pool's buffer for a response, which is held until the controller has transmitted it. The same peer can then cause a client request to be issued while the pool is empty: in-tree profiles start SDP discovery from inbound connection callbacks (for example hfphfaccept() calls btsdpdiscover() through hfphfcreate(), and hfpag.c mirrors this), and a peer acting as an SDP server can force repeated client requests by answering with partial responses carrying continuation state.

With the pool empty, the allocation blocks uninterruptibly and freezes the entire Bluetooth host. The stall becomes permanent when the release of the outstanding buffer itself depends on the blocked workqueue: if the link carrying the queued PDU is dropped or stalls, hcidisconncomplete() and the L2CAP channel cleanup that purges the channel TX queue are themselves btworkq work items, so the buffer is never returned. The result is an unrecoverable denial of service of all Bluetooth functionality until reboot; there is no memory-safety, confidentiality or integrity impact.

The fix allocates client PDUs with KNOWAIT via a new sdpclientcreatepdu(), propagates -ENOBUFS, parks the session on a new SDPCLIENTFLAGWAITFORTXBUF flag, and adds an sdppool destructor that re-submits the SDP client worker when a buffer becomes available. Note that the SDP server role still allocated from the same pool with KFOREVER at this commit; that path was addressed separately.

Affected Software

1 affected component
Zephyr Project Zephyr

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Compensating control

    In the Bluetooth Classic SDP client, allocate outgoing request PDUs with K_NO_WAIT instead of K_FOREVER, propagate -ENOBUFS, park the session on SDP_CLIENT_FLAG_WAIT_FOR_TX_BUF, and have the sdp_pool destructor resubmit the client worker when a buffer becomes available.

Event History

Nov 16, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·09:19 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·09:19 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which devices are exposed to this condition?

Devices using the Bluetooth Classic SDP client are exposed when an SDP client request can be initiated while the shared SDP buffer pool is occupied by an SDP server response. The pool has CONFIG_BT_MAX_CONN buffers, which is one buffer by default, and is shared between the SDP client and server roles.

2

What access does an attacker need to trigger the deadlock?

An attacker only needs to be within BR/EDR Bluetooth range; authentication is not required. They can send an inbound SDP request, which is accepted at BT_SECURITY_L0 and consumes a response buffer, then cause the device to issue an SDP client request while that buffer remains unavailable.

3

What is the operational impact if exploitation succeeds?

The Bluetooth workqueue can block indefinitely waiting for a buffer because allocation uses a K_FOREVER timeout. Since this same single workqueue processes incoming HCI ACL and event traffic, L2CAP activity, and connection and channel teardown, Bluetooth processing can be deadlocked.

Contact

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