CVE-2026-93667: Function pointer type confusion in Zephyr Virtual L2 when a VLAN-tagged frame finds no handling virtual interface

Published Nov 16, 2026
·
Updated

The Virtual L2 receive handler virtualrecv() in subsys/net/l2/virtual/virtual.c ends with a fall-through path meant for a virtual interface that has nothing attached below it: it takes netifgetdevice(iface)->api, treats it as a struct virtualinterfaceapi, and calls api->recv(iface, pkt). That handler is however also invoked with a non-virtual interface: ethernetrecv() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/ethernet.c deliberately passes the Ethernet interface so that a tagged frame can be dispatched over the VLAN interfaces attached to it. For an Ethernet interface dev->api is a struct ethernetapi, whose layout only shares the leading struct netifapi, so the slot read as recv is actually getconfig() (default) or getcapabilities() (when CONFIGNETSTATISTICSETHERNET is enabled).

The fall-through is reached whenever no attached virtual interface claims the frame - most simply when the VLAN interface owning the frame's tag exists but is administratively down, since netethgetvlaniface() resolves the tag without checking link state while virtualrecv() skips interfaces that are not up. Any host able to place an 802.1Q-tagged Ethernet frame on the same link can then trigger the mistyped indirect call; no authentication, IP reachability or user interaction is required, because the frame is consumed at L2 before any address check.

The resulting call passes a struct netif where the driver expects a struct device and a struct netpkt where it expects a struct netif , with the callee's remaining parameters left as whatever the call site happens to leave in the argument registers. Driver implementations dereference these values: getcapabilities() typically reads dev->config/dev->data (a wild read through a non-pointer field of struct netif), and getconfig() implementations write through the uninitialized struct ethernetconfig argument. The practical impact is undefined behaviour in the network RX path - crashes and uncontrolled memory corruption - plus mis-handling of the packet when a capability bitmask is returned as a netverdict. The attacker controls neither the corrupted address nor the value written, so this is a denial-of-service and memory-corruption issue rather than a controllable write primitive.

The same defective fall-through is reachable through anyrecv() in subsys/net/l2/dummy/any/any.c, which passes a dummy interface whose struct dummyapi is shorter than the offset read, producing an out-of-bounds read of the driver's API object followed by an indirect call. The fix drops any packet whose interface is not a Virtual L2 interface, closing both entry points.

Affected Software

1 affected component
Zephyr Project Zephyr

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Compensating control

    In the Virtual L2 receive handler, drop any packet whose interface is not a Virtual L2 interface.

Event History

Nov 16, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·09:19 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·09:19 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which systems are exposed to a remote trigger?

A host is exposed if an attacker can place an 802.1Q-tagged Ethernet frame on the same link and the frame reaches the Virtual L2 receive path without being claimed by an attached virtual interface. A VLAN interface for the frame’s tag that exists but is administratively down is a straightforward triggering condition.

2

Does the behavior depend on Ethernet statistics being enabled?

Yes. With the default layout, the function-pointer slot interpreted as recv corresponds to get_config(); when CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_ETHERNET is enabled, it instead corresponds to get_capabilities().

3

How can I identify a susceptible configuration?

Check whether tagged frames received on an Ethernet interface are dispatched through Virtual L2 and whether the VLAN interface resolved for a tag is administratively down. Virtual L2 skips interfaces that are not up, allowing the unhandled-frame fall-through to be reached.

Contact

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