CVE-2026-93668: Bluetooth BR/EDR SDP server blocks the Bluetooth workqueue indefinitely when the SDP buffer pool is empty

Published Nov 16, 2026
·
Updated

The Bluetooth Classic SDP server in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/sdp.c allocated every response PDU through btsdpcreatepdu(), which expands to btl2capcreatepdu() and therefore uses a KFOREVER timeout. The allocation is made from sdppool, a fixed pool holding only CONFIGBTMAXCONN buffers (one in the default configuration) that is shared with the SDP client role. When the pool is empty the call blocks without a bound.

The allocation is reached from btsdprecv() on the Bluetooth host's RX context: the btworkq "BT RX WQ" workqueue in the default configuration since v3.1.0, and the dedicated "BT RX" thread before that. This context processes all normal-priority HCI events and all received ACL data. The SDP L2CAP server is registered on PSM 0x0001 with no security requirement (BTSECURITYL0), so an unpaired, unauthenticated BR/EDR peer within radio range of a connectable device can drive it. Every malformed or unrecognised SDP PDU reaches senderrrsp(), and the sdpsvcsearchreq(), sdpsvcattreq() and sdpsvcsearchattreq() handlers allocate as well, so a short burst of pipelined requests drains the pool and parks the RX context in the blocking allocation.

A pool buffer is released only once its response has been sent, and a peer that withholds baseband acknowledgements keeps the controller's buffers for the link full, so the response is never sent. While the RX context is blocked, the entire Bluetooth host, for all connections and both LE and BR/EDR, stops processing normal-priority HCI events and received data. In most affected releases the stall is permanent. Queued PDUs are freed only by connection or channel teardown, which waits for the normal-priority Disconnection Complete handler, and that handler runs on the blocked RX context, so the host does not recover without a reset. In v3.7.0 through v4.1.x the TX processor discards the queued response once the link supervision timeout drops the connection, so each stall ends at that timeout, but the peer can reconnect and repeat it for as long as it stays in range. The impact is limited to availability; no memory corruption or information disclosure is involved.

The fix adds sdpsvccreatepdu() using KNOWAIT, pre-allocates the response buffer once in btsdprecv(), stashes the request in sdp->recvpending when no buffer is available, and retries it from a work handler once a buffer is freed by the pool destroy callback.

Affected Software

1 affected component
Zephyr Project Zephyr

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Operational

    Reset the host to recover after the Bluetooth RX context becomes blocked.

Event History

Nov 16, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·09:19 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·09:19 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which deployments are exposed by default?

A connectable device running the Bluetooth Classic SDP server is exposed. The SDP buffer pool holds CONFIG_BT_MAX_CONN buffers, which is one buffer in the default configuration, and the SDP server accepts connections on PSM 0x0001 without a security requirement.

2

Does an attacker need to pair or authenticate first?

No. An unpaired, unauthenticated BR/EDR peer within radio range can reach the SDP server if the target device is connectable.

3

What traffic can cause the service disruption?

Malformed or unrecognised SDP PDUs cause error responses that allocate from the shared pool. Valid service-search, service-attribute, and combined search-and-attribute requests also allocate, so a short pipelined burst can exhaust the pool.

4

What is the practical impact after the pool is exhausted?

The Bluetooth RX execution context can block indefinitely in the allocation. In the default configuration from v3.1.0 onward, this is the BT RX WQ workqueue, which processes all normal-priority HCI events and received ACL data; earlier versions use the dedicated BT RX thread.

Contact

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