CVE-2026-93670: Out-of-bounds write in the DesignWare I3C driver when the device address table is full

Published Nov 16, 2026
·
Updated

The Synopsys DesignWare I3C controller driver (drivers/i3c/i3cdw.c) tracks free Device Address Table (DAT) slots with getfreepos(), which signals an exhausted table by returning -1. The helper declared its return type as uint8t, so the sentinel was truncated to 255, and both consumers (dwi3cattachdevice() and dwi3ci2cattachdevice()) also stored it in a uint8t before testing if (pos < 0) — a comparison that is never true for an unsigned value. The exhaustion guard was therefore inert in every build.

With the guard defeated, an attach attempted on a full DAT proceeds with pos == 255: it writes data->dwi3ci2cprivdata[255].id, more than 200 bytes past the end of the 32-element dwi3ci2cprivdata array and past the end of struct dwi3cdata; it stores the resulting out-of-bounds address in desc->controllerpriv, from which later detach, reattach and IBI operations read the slot index back; and it performs a 32-bit MMIO store 1020 bytes beyond the hardware DAT base, outside the table the controller reports. The attach still returns success, so the upper layer believes the device is bound.

The DAT is smaller than the software array (its depth is read from DEVICEADDRTABLEPOINTER, commonly 8 or 16 entries), so exhaustion is reachable. In a dual-role build (CONFIGI3CDUALROLE with CONFIGI3CUSEIBI) acting as a secondary controller, the attach count is supplied by the bus's active controller: i3csechandoffed() attaches one device per entry of the received DEFTGTS list, so a hostile or malfunctioning controller on the local I3C bus that declares more targets than the local DAT depth triggers the condition once per surplus entry. Exhaustion can also be reached from a devicetree that declares more devices than the table holds, or by repeated i3c attach shell commands.

Impact is bounded: the out-of-bounds store is a single byte of fixed value at a fixed displacement, with no attacker-chosen data or offset, so the realistic outcomes are corruption of neighbouring static driver state, writes into reserved controller registers, and inconsistent driver bookkeeping (a crash or a wedged I3C bus) rather than a controllable memory-write primitive. The attack vector is the local chip-to-chip I3C bus; there is no network-reachable path.

Affected Software

1 affected component
Zephyr Project Zephyr

Event History

Nov 16, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·09:19 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·09:19 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

Frequently Asked Questions

1

What systems are exposed to this issue?

Systems using the Synopsys DesignWare I3C controller driver are affected when an attach operation is attempted after the controller's Device Address Table is full. The DAT depth is hardware-reported and can be smaller than the driver's 32-entry software array.

2

What must happen to trigger the faulty path?

A device attach must occur while no DAT slots remain available. This affects both dw_i3c_attach_device() and dw_i3c_i2c_attach_device().

3

What are the consequences once the table is full?

The attach can return success while writing using slot index 255, including a software write more than 200 bytes beyond the 32-element array and a 32-bit MMIO write 1020 bytes beyond the DAT base. Later detach, reattach, and IBI operations can use the stored out-of-bounds slot index.

Contact

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