CVE-2026-93854: Openstack Blazar vulnerability
In OpenStack Blazar before 17.0.1, the V2 lease API does not enforce object-level authorization on its update and delete operations (PUT /v2/leases/{leaseid} and DELETE /v2/leases/{leaseid}). The policy authorize() wrapper attempts to load the target lease to build the authorization target from its owner, but it looks up the lease under the keyword "leaseid" whereas the controller methods name the parameter "id" (and the wsmepecan.wsexpose wrapper delivers it positionally). The lookup returns None, and thus authorization falls back to the requesting user's own projectid/userid instead of the target lease owner. Any authenticated user who knows a lease ID can therefore modify or delete leases belonging to other users and projects, bypassing the intended ownership check.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
OpenStack Blazar V2 lease APIto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 17.0.1 - Compensating control
Restrict access to the Blazar V2 lease API endpoints (PUT /v2/leases/{lease_id} and DELETE /v2/leases/{lease_id}) so only clients allowed to modify/delete leases they own can reach them.
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments need remediation?
OpenStack Blazar deployments running a version before 17.0.1 are affected where the V2 lease API is available.
What does an attacker need to exploit this issue?
The attacker must be an authenticated user and know the target lease ID. They can then modify or delete a lease owned by another user or project.