CVE-2026-94566: NukeVie: Login Lockout Bypass via Untrusted Forwarded-IP Headers
NukeViet CMS is a multi Content Management System. In 4.6.00, an unauthenticated attacker can rotate X-Forwarded-For because vendor/vinades/nukeviet/Core/Ips.php accepts forwarded client-IP headers without first confirming that REMOTEADDR is a trusted proxy. The resulting NVCLIENTIP keys the administrator login blocker in includes/core/adminlogin.php; changing only the header value bypasses that lockout and permits effectively unlimited password guesses. The same spoofable address is also consumed by the user login blocker in modules/users/funcs/login.php, IP restrictions, bans, flood controls, and security logs, but those additional code-level effects were not dynamically demonstrated. This issue is fixed in version 4.6.01.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.
Fixed in 4.6.01
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed to lockout bypass?
NukeViet CMS version 4.6.00 is affected when its login handling uses the spoofable client address derived from forwarded-IP headers. An attacker can reach the administrator login blocker remotely without authentication.
What does an attacker need to bypass login lockout protections?
The attacker only needs to vary the X-Forwarded-For header value between password attempts. The vulnerable code accepts this header without first verifying that the connecting REMOTE_ADDR is a trusted proxy.
Are user login protections and other IP-based controls affected too?
The same spoofable address is used by the user login blocker, IP restrictions, bans, flood controls, and security logs. However, the additional effects beyond the administrator login lockout bypass were identified in code and were not dynamically demonstrated.
What version fixes the issue?
Upgrade to NukeViet CMS 4.6.01, which contains the fix.