CVE-2026-95825: Reference-count underflow in Zephyr network interface address removal releases an IP address that is still in use

Published Nov 20, 2026
·
Updated

netifipv4addrrm() and netifipv6addrrm() in subsys/net/ip/netif.c unconditionally called netifaddrunref() on the target address. When an earlier removal could not complete because another subsystem still held a reference (the TCP stack takes one on the local address of every connection, in tcpconnnew() and on connect()), the address is left in place with isadded cleared and isused still set. A second removal of such an address decremented the reference count again, consuming a reference owned by that other holder. When it was the last one, the address slot was released, its NETEVENTIPVADDRDEL event fired, and the slot became reusable while the holder still believed it owned a reference.

Every address lookup helper matches on isused and not on isadded, so a half-removed address stays visible to the rest of the stack and repeat removals are readily reachable from remote input. Under IPv6 SLAAC, an on-link node that sends a Router Advertisement with a short valid lifetime causes the address to expire into the deferred state; a refreshing Router Advertisement is handled by netifipv6addrupdatelifetime(), which re-arms the lifetime timer without restoring the reference, so the next expiry performs the second, reference-stealing removal. With CONFIGNETIPV4ACD and DHCPv4, repeated spoofed ARP conflicts for the device's lease drive dhcpv4acdeventhandler() into calling netifipv4addrrm() more than once on the same address. Where CONFIGUSERSPACE is enabled, the netifipv4addrrmbyindex() and netifipv6addrrmbyindex() system calls let an unprivileged user-mode thread trigger the same kernel-side release deterministically.

The impact is loss of a configured IP address while connections are still using it, and a corrupted reference count that propagates: the slot can be handed to a newly added address, and when the stale holder later tears down, netifaddrunref() resolves the address by value and drops the new incarnation's only reference, removing a live address a second time. The affected objects are static array slots and the counter is never decremented below zero, so there is no memory corruption or information disclosure; the consequence is denial of service against the device's network connectivity, repeatable at the attacker's pace.

The fix resolves the address before touching the reference count and returns false without calling netifaddrunref() when the address is already marked as removed, so the public removal API can no longer consume a reference it does not own.

Affected Software

1 affected component
Zephyr Project Zephyr

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Compensating control

    In net_if_ipv4_addr_rm() and net_if_ipv6_addr_rm(), resolve the address before changing its reference count; if it is already marked as removed, return false without calling net_if_addr_unref().

Event History

Nov 20, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·05:54 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·05:54 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·06:18 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness

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