CVE-2026-96455: Reachy Mini daemon allows unauthenticated remote code execution through the app installation endpoint
The Reachy Mini daemon exposes an HTTP API for managing the robot. Its app installation endpoint, POST /apps/install in src/reachymini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py, has no authentication. The handler's only dependency is Depends(getappmanager), which just hands back the manager object from application state, so nothing in the chain ever checks a credential.
The endpoint takes an AppInfo body naming a Hugging Face Space. The daemon downloads that Space and installs it as a Python package through installpackage in src/reachymini/apps/sources/localcommonvenv.py, using uv or pip. Installing a Python package runs the package's own build and setup code, so whoever chooses the Space chooses what code the robot runs. Anyone can publish a public Hugging Face Space, so this is not a meaningful restriction on the attacker.
How far this reaches depends on the model. In resolvebindhost in src/reachymini/daemon/app/main.py the daemon binds 0.0.0.0 when it runs as the wireless version and 127.0.0.1 otherwise, with the vendor's own comment explaining that the robot has to be reachable on the LAN. On a wireless unit, then, any host on the same network can install and run code on the robot without credentials.
One related change has already shipped but does not fix this. Version 1.8.2 replaced the wildcard CORS policy with an allow list of localhost and Tauri origins. That closes the browser drive-by route, where a web page the victim visits silently calls the endpoint in the background. It has no effect on this issue: CORS is enforced by browsers and governs whether script may read a response, while a direct HTTP request from another machine on the network involves no browser, no preflight and no CORS check at all.
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are reachable by remote attackers?
Wireless units bind the daemon to 0.0.0.0, making the API reachable by hosts on the same LAN. Non-wireless deployments bind to 127.0.0.1, so the daemon is exposed only locally unless another mechanism exposes or forwards it.
What does an attacker need to exploit the issue?
No credentials or prior access are required to call the installation endpoint. An attacker only needs network reachability to the daemon and can name a public Hugging Face Space they control, whose package installation code will run on the robot.
Are default access controls sufficient to prevent exploitation?
No. The app installation route has no authentication dependency; it only obtains an application manager from application state, so no credential check occurs in the described request path.
What can be done if patching is not immediately possible?
Restrict network access to the daemon, particularly on wireless units, so untrusted LAN hosts cannot reach its HTTP API. The provided information identifies LAN exposure as the remote attack path.