CVE-2026-96456: Reachy Mini Bluetooth PIN authentication can be bypassed by racing an authenticated device
The Reachy Mini Bluetooth service asks a connecting device for a PIN before it will accept commands. The check protects the session but not the caller, so an attacker in Bluetooth range can ride along on someone else's successful authentication.
The authenticated state is kept in a single shared flag on the service instance rather than per device. BlueZ passes the calling device's identity to the characteristic write handler in the options argument, but WriteValue(self, value, options) in src/reachymini/daemon/app/services/bluetooth/bluetoothservice.py ignores options entirely. The handler therefore has no idea which device sent a given write, and it cannot tell the authenticated one from any other.
Once any device completes the PIN exchange, the flag is set and every nearby device can send CMD commands until it resets. An attacker simply waits within radio range for a legitimate user to authenticate, then writes commands into the same window. No PIN is ever guessed or brute-forced.
This is the second step of a three-step chain that JFrog documented against the robot. The first is the unrestricted file upload in the media sounds API, tracked as CVE-2026-55419, which places an attacker-controlled script on the filesystem. This issue then provides command access over Bluetooth. The third is the Bluetooth command handler path traversal, tracked as CVE-2026-62661, which runs that script as root.
Affected Software
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who is exposed to this issue?
Reachy Mini systems with the affected Bluetooth service are exposed when a legitimate device authenticates over Bluetooth. An attacker must be within Bluetooth radio range during the authenticated window.
Does an attacker need to know or brute-force the Bluetooth PIN?
No. The attacker can wait for another device to complete the PIN exchange, then send CMD_ commands while the service-wide authenticated flag remains set.
What conditions are required for exploitation?
The attacker needs Bluetooth-range access and user interaction in the form of a legitimate device successfully authenticating first. No attacker privileges or prior authentication are required.
How can administrators determine whether the service is affected?
Inspect src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/services/bluetooth/bluetooth_service.py. The affected behavior is present if WriteValue(self, value, options) ignores the BlueZ options argument and authentication is tracked by one shared service-level flag rather than per calling device.