CVE-2026-97564: smb: client: reject userspace cifs.idmap descriptions

Published Sep 25, 2026
·
Updated

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: reject userspace cifs.idmap descriptions

cifs.idmap key descriptions carry authority-bearing fields (owner and group SIDs and uid/gid values in "os:"/"gs:"/"oi:"/"gi:" form) that the cifs.idmap upcall helper treats as kernel-originating inputs. Unlike its sibling cifs.spnego, the cifs.idmap key type has no vetdescription hook, so userspace can create keys of this type through requestkey(2)/addkey(2) and supply those fields without CIFS origin. A requestkey(2) call with a non-NULL callout then drives a root usermodehelper upcall (/sbin/request-key -> cifs.idmap) that consumes the unvetted description in root context.

Only accept cifs.idmap descriptions while CIFS is using its private rootcred to request the key. idtosid()/sidtoid() already run under overridecreds(rootcred), so the kernel-originated path is unaffected.

This mirrors commit 3da1fdf4efbc ("smb: client: reject userspace cifs.spnego descriptions"), which applied the same restriction to cifs.spnego.

Affected Software

1 affected component
Linux Linux kernel

Event History

Sep 25, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·10:21 AM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·10:21 AM
Description
Data Sourced
via NVD·11:17 AM
Description

Frequently Asked Questions

1

What access does an attacker need to trigger the vulnerable path?

The attacker needs the ability to run userspace code that can create or request cifs.idmap keys using request_key(2) or add_key(2). They can provide a non-NULL callout to request_key(2), which causes the request-key mechanism to invoke the cifs.idmap helper.

2

Why can this lead to elevated impact?

The cifs.idmap helper treats fields in the key description, including owner/group SIDs and UID/GID values, as kernel-originating authority-bearing input. Before the fix, user-controlled descriptions could be consumed by a root usermodehelper through /sbin/request-key -> cifs.idmap.

3

Does the fix disrupt normal CIFS ID mapping requests?

No. The kernel-originated id_to_sid() and sid_to_id() paths already request keys while using CIFS's private root_cred, so they remain accepted.

4

What configuration condition indicates exposure?

Exposure exists where userspace can create or request cifs.idmap keys and the cifs.idmap request-key helper is available for invocation. The vulnerable behavior is specifically the acceptance of user-created cifs.idmap descriptions.

Contact

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