CVE-2026-97687: urllib3: HTTPS proxy TLS configuration may be ignored or overridden

Published Sep 29, 2026
·
Updated

Impact

urllib3 supports configuring TLS independently for an HTTPS proxy and the target server.

proxysslcontext, proxyasserthostname, and proxyassertfingerprint configure the TLS connection to the proxy. sslcontext and the other target-specific TLS parameters configure the connection to the target server.

In urllib3 versions 1.26.0 through 2.7.0, these configurations were not consistently separated. Depending on the proxy mode, urllib3 could:

1. Ignore proxysslcontext and use the target server's SSL context for the TLS connection to an HTTPS forwarding proxy. 2. Override the HTTPS proxy's certificate-verification policy with the target server's certificate-verification policy. 3. Apply target-specific SNI, hostname assertions, certificate fingerprint assertions, or TLS client credentials to the TLS connection to an HTTPS forwarding proxy.

In particular, configuring certreqs="CERTNONE" for a target server could overwrite the verifymode of the SSL context configured for the HTTPS proxy. This modification occurred in place and persisted on the context object, potentially disabling proxy certificate verification for later connections that reused the same context.

An attacker able to intercept the connection to an HTTPS proxy may be able to impersonate the proxy when the effective proxy TLS configuration disables certificate verification or otherwise accepts the attacker's certificate. This may occur, for example, when the target server's trust or identity policy is incorrectly applied to the proxy connection.

When HTTPS forwarding is enabled, an impersonated proxy can observe or modify forwarded requests and responses, potentially exposing credentials, authentication tokens, request bodies, response data, and other sensitive information.

A TLS client certificate intended for the target server may also be presented to the proxy or to an attacker impersonating it. This can disclose the client's identity and provide proof of possession of the corresponding private key. The private key itself is not transmitted during the TLS handshake.

In CONNECT tunneling mode, impersonating the HTTPS proxy does not by itself defeat the separate end-to-end TLS connection between the client and the target server.

Affected Usages

Code using urllib3 versions 1.26.0 through 2.7.0 may be affected in any of the following cases.

1. The target SSL context is used for an HTTPS forwarding proxy

HTTPS requests are forwarded through an HTTPS proxy with useforwardingforhttps=True, and proxysslcontext is configured for the proxy.

urllib3 may ignore proxysslcontext and use the target server's sslcontext for the proxy TLS handshake. The proxy may therefore be verified using the target server's trust and certificate policy instead of the policy explicitly configured for the proxy.

2. The target verification policy overrides the proxy policy

An HTTPS proxy is configured with proxysslcontext, while the target server uses a different certificate-verification policy.

urllib3 may apply the target server's certreqs value to the proxy SSL context. For example, setting certreqs="CERTNONE" for the target server may also disable certificate verification for the HTTPS proxy, even when proxysslcontext was configured to require verification.

This issue can affect the TLS connection to an HTTPS proxy in both forwarding and CONNECT tunneling configurations.

3. A mutated proxy SSL context is reused

The same SSL context is reused as proxysslcontext across multiple connections, and certificate verification is disabled for one target server.

urllib3 may modify the proxy SSL context's verifymode in place. Later connections that reuse the same context may therefore connect to the HTTPS proxy without certificate verification.

4. Target-specific TLS identity or credentials are applied to the proxy

HTTPS requests are forwarded through an HTTPS proxy with useforwardingforhttps=True, and target-specific SNI, hostname assertions, certificate fingerprint assertions, or TLS client credentials are configured.

urllib3 may apply these target-specific settings to the proxy TLS handshake. This may cause urllib3 to:

- send SNI intended for the target server to the proxy; - verify the proxy using a hostname or certificate fingerprint intended for the target server; or - present a TLS client certificate intended for the target server to the proxy.

Code connecting through a plain HTTP proxy does not establish a TLS connection to the proxy and is not affected by this issue.

Remediation

Upgrade to urllib3 2.8.0 or later.

urllib3 2.8.0 independently applies the explicitly configured proxysslcontext and proxy-specific certificate assertions to the HTTPS proxy connection. Target-specific SNI, certificate assertions, and TLS client certificate parameters are no longer applied to the HTTPS proxy handshake.

For backward compatibility, when an HTTPS proxy is used with useforwardingforhttps=True and proxysslcontext is not provided, urllib3 2.8.0 continues to use sslcontext for the TLS connection to the proxy. This configuration emits a FutureWarning. In urllib3 3.0, passing sslcontext with useforwardingforhttps=True for an HTTPS proxy will raise an error. Applications should use proxysslcontext to configure TLS for an HTTPS forwarding proxy.

The fixes were implemented in commits b6447295fff7b38fdffc67e0df9712d60cef3cc3 and 07408cec79d1856d81bb42c74a904a24fdb9e465.

Other sources

urllib3 is an HTTP client library for Python. From 1.26.0 until 2.8.0, the proxysslcontext, proxyasserthostname, proxyassertfingerprint, sslcontext, certreqs, verifymode, useforwardingforhttps=True, and CERTNONE configuration paths fail to remain separated because target-server TLS settings are incorrectly applied to the HTTPS proxy connection. The trigger is that an application uses an HTTPS proxy and configures target-server TLS settings that must remain separate from the proxy TLS handshake, including HTTPS forwarding with target-specific identity or credentials. Applying certreqs=CERTNONE can overwrite proxysslcontext.verifymode in place, and the mutation persists so later connections reusing the same context may connect to the HTTPS proxy without certificate verification. The attack mechanism is that an attacker intercepts and impersonates the HTTPS proxy after the effective proxy policy accepts the attacker's certificate. The impact is that the attacker can observe or modify forwarded traffic or receive a target TLS client certificate, while CONNECT tunneling still preserves the separate end-to-end target TLS connection. This issue is fixed in version 2.8.0.

— NVD

urllib3: HTTPS proxy TLS configuration may be ignored or overridden

— Microsoft

Affected Software

4 affected componentsFixes available
pypi/urllib3>=1.26.0<2.8.0
pip/urllib3>=1.26.0<2.8.0
2.8.0
Python urllib3>=1.26.0<2.8.0
debian/python-urllib3<=1.26.12-1+deb12u4, <=2.3.0-3+deb13u2
2.8.0-2

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade pip/urllib3 to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.8.0
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade debian/python-urllib3 to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.8.0-2
  3. Upgrade

    Upgrade urllib3 to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 2.8.0
  4. Configuration

    Configure the HTTPS forwarding proxy with proxy_ssl_context and proxy-specific certificate assertions, keeping proxy TLS settings separate from the target server's ssl_context, cert_reqs, SNI, hostname assertions, certificate fingerprint assertions, and TLS client credentials.

    urllib3 HTTPS proxy proxy_ssl_context = independent TLS configuration for the proxy

Event History

Sep 29, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·03:30 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·03:30 PM
DescriptionWeakness
Data Sourced
via NVD·04:17 PM
RemedyDescriptionSeverityWeaknessAffected Software
Sep 30, 2026
Advisory Published
via GitHub·02:46 PM
Data Sourced
via GitHub·02:46 PM
DescriptionWeaknessAffected Software
Oct 3, 2026
Data Sourced
via Microsoft·08:38 AM
DescriptionSeverityWeakness
Oct 15, 2026
Data Sourced
via Ubuntu·10:52 PM
RemedyDescriptionSeverityAffected Software
Data Sourced
via Debian·10:53 PM
DescriptionAffected Software
Data Sourced
via Launchpad·10:53 PM
Description

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which deployments are realistically exposed to interception?

Applications using an HTTPS proxy and configuring TLS settings intended for the target server are exposed when those settings weaken or alter verification of the proxy connection. The practical attack requires an attacker to intercept and impersonate the HTTPS proxy after the effective proxy policy accepts the attacker’s certificate.

2

Does this affect ordinary CONNECT-based HTTPS proxying in the same way?

CONNECT tunneling preserves the separate end-to-end TLS connection to the target server. The described traffic observation, modification, and possible exposure of a target TLS client certificate applies to HTTPS forwarding, including use of use_forwarding_for_https=True with target-specific identity or credentials.

3

Can the unsafe proxy verification state persist beyond one request?

Yes. Setting cert_reqs=CERT_NONE can overwrite proxy_ssl_context.verify_mode in place, and the changed context can be reused by later connections that then connect to the HTTPS proxy without certificate verification.

4

What version contains the fix?

The issue is fixed in urllib3 2.8.0. The affected range is from 1.26.0 until 2.8.0.

Contact

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