CVE-2026-97692: BACnet Stack: pre-auth out-of-bounds read that escalates to an out-of-bounds write into global memory
BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to versions 1.4.6, 1.5.2, and 1.6.1, the BACnet/SC message decoder walks the header-option list by following each option's MORE bit. Nothing rejects a list whose last option still has the MORE bit set, and the decode walk has no upper bound on how many options it processes. A single crafted BVLC-SC frame makes the walk advance one option past the end of the message and read message[messagelen], one byte out of bounds. When the bytes after the message carry more MORE-set option markers, the walk keeps going: it runs past the fixed 4-entry option array and writes decoded option fields out of bounds. On the server that decode array is the static global bscdm, so the out-of-bounds write lands in adjacent BSS. Both faults are reachable before authentication, from the first frame a peer sends on a BACnet/SC connection, and the bytes that follow the message are the same peer's prior-frame data. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.6, 1.5.2, 1.6.1, and 1.7.0.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.
Fixed in 1.4.6 - Upgrade
Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.
Fixed in 1.5.2 - Upgrade
Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.
Fixed in 1.6.1 - Upgrade
Upgrade to a fixed release to a version that resolves this vulnerability.
Fixed in 1.7.0
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Which deployments are exposed to this issue?
Deployments using the BACnet/SC message decoder in BACnet Stack versions before 1.4.6, 1.5.2, or 1.6.1 are affected. The server-side decode array is a static global, so server deployments can experience writes into adjacent BSS memory.
Does an attacker need credentials or a prior authenticated session?
No. Both the out-of-bounds read and the subsequent out-of-bounds writes are reachable before authentication, starting with the first frame a peer sends on a BACnet/SC connection.
What conditions are required to trigger the out-of-bounds write?
An attacker sends a crafted BVLC-SC frame whose final header option retains the MORE bit. If bytes after the message contain additional MORE-set option markers, the decoder continues past its fixed four-entry option array and writes decoded fields out of bounds.
Which versions contain the fix?
The issue is patched in versions 1.4.6, 1.5.2, 1.6.1, and 1.7.0.