CVE-2026-97702: Open edX: Support "manage_course_team" REST API omits the `require_support_permission` gate its sibling support views enforce
Open edX Platform enables the authoring and delivery of online learning at any scale. From the Ulmo release until release/ulmo.4 and release/verawood.1, the GET /api/support/v1/managecourseteam/ endpoint in CourseTeamManageAPIView requires only IsAuthenticated and omits the global support-role authorization check intended for this help-desk surface. Any authenticated learner can supply an email, username, or userid for an arbitrary target and use the 200 and 404 response discrepancy to distinguish an active account from an absent or inactive account. A caller with a course-level or organization-level instructor role can additionally obtain the target user's staff or instructor assignments within the caller's course or organization scope. Anonymous callers remain blocked, and the separately authorized PUT behavior is outside this vulnerability. This issue is fixed in release/ulmo.4 and release/verawood.1.
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
Open edX Platformto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in release/ulmo.4 - Upgrade
Upgrade
Open edX Platformto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in release/verawood.1
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
Who can exploit the affected endpoint, and what access do they need?
Any authenticated learner can query the endpoint; anonymous callers are blocked. A course-level or organization-level instructor can obtain additional information about a target user's staff or instructor assignments within the instructor's own course or organization scope.
What information can an authenticated learner obtain?
They can supply an arbitrary email address, username, or user ID and use the difference between 200 and 404 responses to determine whether the target corresponds to an active account rather than an absent or inactive account.
Are all operations on this API affected?
No. The issue applies to GET /api/support/v1/manage_course_team/. The separately authorized PUT behavior is outside the scope of this vulnerability.
Which releases contain the fix?
The issue is fixed in release/ulmo.4 and release/verawood.1.