CVE-2026-98364: xfrm: hold net_device reference under RCU in bundle creation

Published Oct 6, 2026
·
Updated

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

xfrm: hold netdevice reference under RCU in bundle creation

xfrmbundlecreate() and xfrmcreatedummybundle() read dst->dev into a local pointer without taking a device reference, then pass it to xfrmfilldst(). A concurrent RTMDELLINK replaces dst->dev via dstdevput() and frees the old netdevice, causing a use-after-free when xfrm6filldst() later dereferences the stale dev pointer.

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in xfrm6filldst+0x82c/0x860 (net/ipv6/xfrm6policy.c:86 netdevhold()) Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880142fe588 by task exploit/153 Call Trace: xfrm6filldst+0x82c/0x860 xfrmresolveandcreatebundle+0x21d4/0x2bd0 xfrmlookupwithifid+0x485/0x1640 ip6dstlookupflow+0x19b/0x1e0 udpv6sendmsg+0x1443/0x2dd0

Fix this by reading dst->dev via dstdevrcu() and keeping the RCU read-side critical section active until xfrmfilldst() has taken the required device references.

Affected Software

1 affected component
Linux Linux kernel

Event History

Oct 6, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·08:46 AM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·08:46 AM
Description
Data Sourced
via NVD·09:18 AM
Description

Frequently Asked Questions

1

What conditions are required to trigger the use-after-free?

The issue requires a race between XFRM bundle creation and a concurrent RTM_DELLINK operation. The link deletion can replace dst->dev and free the prior net_device while xfrm_fill_dst() later uses the stale pointer.

2

Which execution path is shown to reach the vulnerable dereference?

The reported call trace reaches xfrm6_fill_dst() through xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle(), xfrm_lookup_with_ifid(), ip6_dst_lookup_flow(), and udpv6_sendmsg(). This indicates an IPv6 XFRM bundle-resolution path.

3

How can I identify whether this issue has occurred on a system?

The supplied report shows KASAN detecting a slab-use-after-free in xfrm6_fill_dst(), at net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c:86 during netdev_hold(). Kernel logs containing that function and a KASAN use-after-free report are evidence of the condition.

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