CVE-2026-98600: Bluetooth: RFCOMM: Reject short EA=0 frames in rfcomm_recv_frame()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: RFCOMM: Reject short EA=0 frames in rfcommrecvframe()
While rfcommrecvframe() verifies that skb->len is at least sizeof(hdr) + 1 (4 bytes: 3-byte header + 1-byte FCS), an RFCOMM frame with an extended 2-byte length field (!testea(hdr->len)) has a 4-byte header plus a 1-byte FCS (5 bytes minimum, sizeof(hdr) + 2).
When a 4-byte RFCOMM frame with EA == 0 arrives: 1. The initial skb->len < sizeof(hdr) + 1 check passes (4 < 4 is false). 2. Trimming the FCS byte decrements skb->len to 3. 3. If checkfcs() succeeds, skbpull(skb, 4) fails (4 > 3) and returns NULL without advancing skb->data. 4. Because the return value of skbpull() is ignored, the un-pulled 3-byte struct rfcommhdr remains at skb->data and is either queued as application payload via rfcommrecvdata() or parsed as a multiplexer control command via rfcommrecvmcc() on DLCI 0.
Fix this by extending the length check in rfcommrecvframe() to also require skb->len >= sizeof(hdr) + 2 when !testea(hdr->len).
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.12.112 - Upgrade
Upgrade
linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.18.55 - Upgrade
Upgrade
linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.2.9 - Configuration
Extend the length check in rfcomm_recv_frame() to require skb->len >= sizeof(*hdr) + 2 for frames where !__test_ea(hdr->len).
Linux kernel Bluetooth RFCOMM rfcomm_recv_frame() length validation = skb->len >= sizeof(*hdr) + 2 when !__test_ea(hdr->len)
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What must an attacker be able to do to trigger this issue?
An attacker must be able to send a malformed 4-byte RFCOMM frame with the EA bit cleared and a valid FCS to the affected RFCOMM receive path. The malformed frame can cause the RFCOMM header to remain unconsumed and be handled as payload or as a multiplexer control command.
Which systems are exposed?
Systems running an affected Linux kernel with Bluetooth RFCOMM traffic reaching rfcomm_recv_frame() are exposed. The provided information does not identify affected kernel versions or whether RFCOMM is enabled by default.
How can I tell whether the fix is present?
Check whether the kernel includes the RFCOMM receive-path change that rejects EA=0 frames shorter than sizeof(struct rfcomm_hdr) + 2 bytes. The referenced stable commits contain this fix.