CVE-2026-98613: bpf: Bound ownership depth through local kptrs and graph roots

Published Oct 18, 2026
·
Updated

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Bound ownership depth through local kptrs and graph roots

Program-allocated objects can own other local objects through referenced kptrs. bpfobjfreefields() follows those pointers through bpfobjdropimpl() synchronously, before the object storage is freed through RCU. A self-referential local kptr type therefore permits arbitrarily deep object chains, and dropping the head can exhaust the kernel stack. Long acyclic type chains have the same problem.

btfcheckandfixupfields() still assumes referenced kptrs only point to kernel types and checks ownership through list and rbtree roots only. Its existing rule is sufficient for graph-only cycles: the target of each graph edge must contain a node, so every type in a cycle has both a root and a node. The rule rejects such a type owning another root, breaking every cycle. It also limits graph-only chains to three types, or two if the first type contains a node, and conservatively rejects longer acyclic chains. The missing local-kptr edges, rather than a missed graph-only cycle, are the bug introduced by support for bpfkptrxchg() into local kptrs.

Replace that restriction with one bounded ownership walk covering graph roots and local referenced kptrs. Run it after all BTF records have been fixed up, reject cycles and paths deeper than eight record-bearing types, and cache each type's suffix depth while checking it against the remaining budget. This also permits the longer acyclic graph-only layouts rejected by the old rule; update their existing BTF tests accordingly.

Keep the bound independent of MAXCALLFRAMES because recursive destruction can run below a BPF call chain. A plain local pointee without special-field metadata adds only a final non-recursing drop. Non-owning kptrs and kernel-BTF kptrs do not recurse through local records and remain outside the walk. Include local percpu-kptr edges too, although allocation of percpu objects with special fields is currently forbidden, so that relaxing that restriction cannot bypass the ownership bound.

btfcheckandfixupfields() continues to initialize graphroot.valuerec, including for separately allocated map records. The ownership relationships belong to immutable program BTF and only need validation at BTF load time.

Affected Software

1 affected component
Linux Linux kernel

Event History

Oct 18, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·03:19 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·03:19 PM
Description
Data Sourced
via NVD·04:17 PM
Description

Contact

SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
132 Wickham Terrace
Fortitude Valley,
QLD 4006, Australia
info@secalerts.co
By using SecAlerts services, you agree to our services end-user license agreement. This website is safeguarded by reCAPTCHA and governed by the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service. All names, logos, and brands of products are owned by their respective owners, and any usage of these names, logos, and brands for identification purposes only does not imply endorsement. If you possess any content that requires removal, please get in touch with us.
© 2026 SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
ABN: 70 645 966 203, ACN: 645 966 203