CVE-2026-98811: net/sched: cls_api: reclaim an empty proto on the error path
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: clsapi: reclaim an empty proto on the error path
Two racing tc filter add requests on the same chain/prio of an unlocked classifier both run change() on the shared proto and both can fail: the winner's tcfchaintpdeleteempty() attempt gives up because the loser's handle is still in the idr, and the loser's error path drops only its own reference without a second reclamation attempt. The empty proto stays linked in the chain, holding the chain reference, a block reference and the classifier module reference until the chain or block is torn down.
Reclaim the proto on the error path of any failed request that holds a proto reference. The reclamation is emptiness-gated: tcfchaintpdeleteempty() unlinks the proto only when deleteempty() admits it is empty, so a live shared proto is never unlinked. A proto the request created is reclaimed unconditionally - it is the only owner, so marking it for deletion is safe even without a deleteempty callback. Classifiers without one (the check marks the proto unconditionally) are rtnl-serialized, so the raced window this guard closes cannot arise for them.
This is a follow-up to commit d4e359b3608a ("net/sched: clsapi: fix teardown of an adopted proto on insert-race loss"), which stopped the loser of the insert race from unlinking the winner's live proto but left the empty-proto residual in place.
Conditions to recreate: - CONFIGNETCLSFLOWER=y; veth pair - tc qdisc add dev veth0 ingress - two concurrent tc filter add dev veth0 ingress protocol ip pref 1 flower skipsw ... action drop (both fail in flhwreplacefilter after publishing their handle in the idr); repeat in a loop - an empty flower tp stays linked after both requests fail; visible as a bare filter protocol ip pref 1 flower chain 0 header in tc filter show with no filter entries - CAPNETADMIN (namespace-local via unshare -Urn suffices)
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
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debian/linuxto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.12.113-1 - Upgrade
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debian/linuxto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.2.10-1 - Upgrade
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debian/linux-6.12to a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.12.113-1~deb12u1 - Upgrade
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linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 5.15.224 - Upgrade
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linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.1.191 - Upgrade
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linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.6.160 - Upgrade
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linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.12.113 - Upgrade
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linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.18.56 - Upgrade
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linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.2.10 - Upgrade
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debian/linuxto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.12.115-2Fixed in 7.2.12-1Fixed in 7.2.15-1 - Upgrade
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azurelinux/kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.6.161.1-1
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What conditions are required to trigger the reference leak?
Two tc filter-add requests must race on the same chain and priority of an unlocked classifier, and both requests must fail while operating on the shared proto.
What is retained if the race occurs?
An empty proto can remain linked in the chain, retaining references to the chain, block, and classifier module until the chain or block is torn down.
Are classifiers without a delete_empty callback exposed to this race?
No. Such classifiers are rtnl-serialized, so the raced window addressed by this fix cannot arise for them.