CVE-2026-98942: sched_ext: Build the cid tables privately and publish them with RCU

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

schedext: Build the cid tables privately and publish them with RCU

The cid tables are visible to the cid kfuncs while being modified: the first enable publishes the global pointers before filling them, ops.initcids() overrides rewrite them in place, and re-enables rebuild them in place. A racing TRACING or SYSCALL program can read unfilled entries, including uninitialized memory in the kmalloc'd tables, or torn topo updates.

Tie the tables' lifetimes to the root sched instead: each root enable builds a fresh set privately and publishes the per-table rcu globals once the layout is final, and root disable unpublishes and RCU-frees the set. A non-NULL global is now always a fully built table which stays valid for the reader's RCU read section, and lookups stay two loads. Kfuncs treat NULL as no-mapping, also after the scheduler exits instead of reporting the stale last mapping.

The cid kfuncs are available whether the root scheduler is cid-form or cpu-form, the latter to allow gradual migration to cids. Every root therefore builds and publishes a default mapping.

Every reader must either be gated on scheduler liveness or NULL-check inside an RCU read section. Fix the two kfuncs that were neither: scxbpfthiscid() read the table with no RCU or preemption protection and scxbpftaskcid() relied on KFRCU, which doesn't put a sleepable program in an RCU read section. The hotplug callbacks are instead serialized by retiring the tables inside the cpusreadlock() section that clears scxroot.

v2: Document why every root builds the tables (desc + cid.c comment).