CVE-2026-99380: smb: client: validate NT transaction response layout and offsets
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: validate NT transaction response layout and offsets
validatentransact() assumes that the response uses the fixed 18-word NT transaction layout. A different WordCount makes getbcc() locate the byte count at a different offset from pSMBr->ByteCount, allowing the subsequent bounds checks to use inconsistent response boundaries.
The function also turns the 32-bit ParameterOffset and DataOffset fields into pointers before checking their bounds. On a 32-bit client, a large offset can wrap the pointer below endofsmb and pass the one-sided pointer comparison. The caller then dereferences the parameter pointer or copies from the data pointer.
Require the expected WordCount before reading the byte count. Check each offset and count against the received SMB length as integers before forming either pointer. Use subtraction after validating the offset so that the range checks cannot overflow.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.18.61 - Upgrade
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linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.3.2 - Upgrade
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debian/linuxto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.3.3-1 - Upgrade
Upgrade
debian/linuxto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.3.4-1Fixed in 7.3.5-1 - Compensating control
In validate_ntransact(), require the expected WordCount before reading the byte count; validate ParameterOffset and DataOffset and their counts against the received SMB length as integers before forming pointers, then use subtraction after validating the offset so bounds checks cannot overflow.