CVE-2026-99416: ovl: read the nlink xattr of every indexed non-dir
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovl: read the nlink xattr of every indexed non-dir
With nfsexport=on, data written through a file handle to a lower file, i.e. a file that exists only in a lower layer of the overlay, can be lost on the next mount. A lookup of the file by name then returns -EIO. Also, a file with one name reports stnlink 2 once it has been copied to the upper layer. After such a file is removed, its file handle can still open it until the next mount.
Before a lower file is changed for the first time, overlayfs copies it to the writable upper layer. This is called copy up.
The index directory is $workdir/index, where $workdir is the directory given by the workdir= option. Each entry is named after the file handle of a lower inode, so that overlayfs can get from the handle to the copied up inode.
With nfsexport=on, copy up indexes every non-directory: it copies the file to an entry in the index directory and then hard links that entry into the upper directory. The index entry is an extra link to the upper inode, so overlayfs stores the link count that users should see in the overlay.nlink xattr.
A file can also be opened by handle, either by an NFS client or by a process with CAPDACREADSEARCH calling openbyhandleat(). If the file is not in the dcache, its overlay dentry is disconnected, i.e. it has no parent yet. Copy up then creates the index entry but no hard link in the upper directory. The index entry has inlink 1 and holds the only copy of the data written to the file.
ovlgetnlink() reads the stored count. Its caller passes a default, which the function returns if there is no stored count. If the lower inode has inlink 1, the function returns the default without reading the xattr. That was correct as long as only lower files with multiple links were indexed.
On the next mount, ovlverifyindex() looks for orphans, i.e. index entries of files whose last name was removed. For an index entry with inlink 1, it passes a default of 0 to ovlgetnlink() and treats a result of 0 as an orphan. Here the lower inode also has inlink 1, so the result is the default. ovlindexdircleanup() then replaces the entry with a whiteout, which in the index marks a file as deleted. The written data is lost.
A lookup by name then returns -EIO, because a whiteout as the index entry of a lower file that still exists is a bad index.
ovlgetinode() gets the wrong count the same way. Its default is the inlink of the upper inode, which includes the index entry, so a copied up file with one name reports stnlink 2.
When that name is removed, the count drops to 1 rather than 0. ovlnlinkend() replaces the index entry with a whiteout only at a count of 0, so the entry stays, and the handle of the removed file still opens it.
Reproduced by writing through openbyhandleat() to an uncached lower file with one link. After a remount the data was lost, and the name returned EIO.
Fix this by adding an argument to ovlgetnlink() that says whether the caller found an index entry, and by skipping the xattr only if the caller found none.
Known gaps: - An index entry that a kernel without this patch left behind for a removed file now stays, and the handle of that file keeps working. The entry has inlink 1 and a stored count of 1, just like the entry of a file that was only written by handle. Without this patch, the next mount treated it as an orphan.