CVE-2026-99421: ovl: always encode the origin fh when index is enabled

Published Nov 19, 2026
·
Updated

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ovl: always encode the origin fh when index is enabled

On an overlay with index=on,nfsexport=on, copy up of a directory crashes the kernel once an LSM has started to deny CAPDACREADSEARCH to the mounter, the task that mounted the overlay. The mount and the LSM policy change require root. After that, any user who can write to a directory that exists only in a lower layer triggers the oops by doing so.

Before a file or directory that exists only in a lower layer is changed for the first time, overlayfs copies it to the writable upper layer. This is called copy up.

On copy up, ovlgetoriginfh() encodes the file handle of the lower inode, called the origin. It returns NULL if ovlcandecodefh() says that the lower filesystem cannot decode handles. Whether the callers can handle NULL depends on the index option:

- Without an index, NULL is fine: the callers store an empty origin xattr. - With index enabled, overlayfs keeps entries for copied up inodes in an internal index directory. The name of an index entry is derived from the handle, so ovlgetoriginfh() must return a handle or an error.

The mount only enables the index if ovlcandecodefh() succeeds for all layers, but the result can change later. The function checks the export operations of the filesystem and capable(CAPDACREADSEARCH). Copy up runs with the mounter's credentials, and an LSM can start to deny the capability to those credentials after the mount. ovlgetoriginfh() then returns NULL with index enabled.

This goes wrong in two callers:

- With nfsexport=on, copy up of a directory creates an index entry for the directory. ovlcreateindex() passes the NULL handle to ovlgetindexnamefh(), which dereferences it. - If the result changes while mount(2) is still running, ovlgetindexdir() passes a NULL from ovlgetoriginfh() to ovlverifysetfh() in the same way.

Before the commit in the Fixes tag, these two callers encoded the handle themselves, without consulting ovlcandecodefh().

Reproduced with a BPF LSM program that started to deny the capability after the mount. An unprivileged touch in a directory that had not been copied up yet oopsed in ovlgetindexnamefh(). With this patch the touch succeeds and the directory gets its index entry.

Fix this by calling ovlcandecodefh() in ovlgetoriginfh() only when index is disabled.

Affected Software

7 affected componentsFixes available
linux/kernel>=6.6.72<6.6.73
6.6.73
linux/kernel>=6.7.0<6.12.117
6.12.117
linux/kernel>=6.13.0<6.18.61
6.18.61
linux/kernel>=6.19.0<7.3.2
7.3.2
debian/linux<6.12.117-1
6.12.117-1
debian/linux<7.3.3-1
7.3.3-1
debian/linux<=6.12.107-1
6.1.176-16.1.192-26.12.117-17.3.4-17.3.5-1

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade linux/Kernel to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 6.6.73
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade linux/Kernel to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 6.12.117
  3. Upgrade

    Upgrade linux/Kernel to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 6.18.61
  4. Upgrade

    Upgrade linux/Kernel to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 7.3.2
  5. Upgrade

    Upgrade debian/linux to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 6.12.117-1
  6. Upgrade

    Upgrade debian/linux to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 7.3.3-1
  7. Upgrade

    Upgrade debian/linux to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 6.1.176-1Fixed in 6.1.192-2Fixed in 6.12.117-1Fixed in 7.3.4-1Fixed in 7.3.5-1

Event History

Nov 19, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·02:40 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·02:40 PM
Description
Data Sourced
via OSV·02:40 PM
DescriptionAffected Software
Data Sourced
via NVD·03:17 PM
Description

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