CVE-2026-99485: accel/amdxdna: clear the mailbox channel pointer when starting it fails

Published Nov 19, 2026
·
Updated

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

accel/amdxdna: clear the mailbox channel pointer when starting it fails

aie2createcontext() allocates a mailbox channel, starts it, and on a failed start frees it again:

hwctx->priv->mboxchann = xdnamailboxallocchannel(ndev->mbox); ... ret = xdnamailboxstartchannel(hwctx->priv->mboxchann, ...); if (ret) goto freechannel; ... freechannel: xdnamailboxfreechannel(hwctx->priv->mboxchann);

hwctx->priv->mboxchann keeps pointing at the freed channel. That pointer is the driver's own test for whether a hardware context has a usable channel: aie2destroycontext() returns early on NULL, aie2schedjobrun() refuses to run a job on NULL, and the message helpers return -ENODEV on NULL. A stale pointer passes all of them.

It matters on the restart path. aie2hwctxrestart() calls aie2createcontext() again on a hardware context that is already live, after aie2hwctxstop() has torn its channel down, and the context survives a failure there: aie2schedjobtimedout() discards the return value entirely, and aie2hwctxresume() only propagates it. What is left is a live hardware context holding a freed channel, and every later user of it takes the non-NULL branch:

- the next job submitted reaches xdnamailboxsendmsg() on the freed channel, via the !mboxchann guard in aie2schedjobrun(), - a second command timeout reaches aie2hwctxstop() -> aie2destroycontext(), - closing the device reaches aie2hwctxfini() -> aie2releaseresource() -> xrsreleaseresource() -> aie2xrsunload() -> aie2destroycontext(),

and aie2destroycontext() then calls xdnamailboxstopchannel() followed by xdnamailboxfreechannel() on memory that was already freed: a use-after-free, and a second free of the same channel.

The AIE4 management channel already does this correctly - aie4mailboxstart() clears ndev->aie.mgmtchann right after freeing it. Do the same here.

The create path itself is not affected: when aie2xrsload() fails, xrsallocateresource() removes the solver node without calling ->unload, and aie2hwctxinit() frees hwctx->priv, so the stale pointer never outlives the structure holding it.

Starting a channel can fail today without this patch: the ring buffer sizes firmware reports are rejected unless both are powers of two, and requestirq() can fail.

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Compensating control

    In accel/amdxdna, clear hwctx->priv->mbox_chann when xdna_mailbox_start_channel() fails, after freeing the channel.

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