CVE-2026-99563: smb: smbdirect: release failed pending sockets of a listener

Published Nov 19, 2026
·
Updated

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: smbdirect: release failed pending sockets of a listener

A child of a listener only left the listen.pending or listen.ready list via smbdirectsocketaccept() or when the listener was destroyed. So every connection that failed before it was accepted (negotiate timeout, peer disconnect, invalid negotiate request, ...) stayed on the list and counted against the backlog until the listener was destroyed. After about backlog (10 for ksmbd) such connections smbdirectlistenconnectrequest() rejected every new connection with -EBUSY, so an unauthenticated peer was able to permanently stop ksmbd from accepting SMB-Direct connections.

Now a failed child moves itself to a new listen.orphaned list at the end of smbdirectsocketcleanupwork(), after the disconnect was started, and queues listen.purgeorphanedwork, which releases it with smbdirectsocketrelease(), without holding the listener's rdmalockhandler() lock, in the same way smbdirectsocketdestroy() does for the remaining children. Orphaned sockets still count against the backlog until they are released.

sc->accept.listener is now only changed under listener->listen.lock and whoever clears it is responsible for releasing the socket: smbdirectsocketaccept(), purgeorphanedwork or the destroy of the listener.

In order to make that work:

- a struct smbdirectsocket that is a listener is now freed via kfreercu(), so that a child can dereference sc->accept.listener under rcureadlock(), even if the listener is released concurrently.

- smbdirectlistenconnectrequest() adds nsc to the listen.pending list and sets nsc->accept.listener before it calls smbdirectacceptconnectrequest(), and always returns 0 so the rdmacm core keeps the connection id and nsc owns it. On a non-zero return it schedules nsc's teardown with smbdirectsocketschedulecleanup(), which orphans it off the listener so that purgeorphanedwork releases it; nsc destroys its own connection id with rdmadestroyid() in that teardown. The teardown has to be deferred because the rdmacm core holds nsc's idpriv->handlermutex across the handler, so nsc->rdma.cmid must not be destroyed synchronously from here. That same handlermutex (and the listener's) also guarantees nsc can't go away under us, so setting the listener before the call is safe and lets a failure orphan nsc.

- smbdirectacceptnegotiaterecvwork() no longer moves a socket to the ready list if it already failed or no longer belongs to the listener. Every accepting socket has a listener, so if sc->accept.listener is already cleared, it no longer sends a negotiate response, as the socket is about to be released.

- smbdirectsocketdestroy() of the listener disables purgeorphanedwork and also releases the orphaned sockets.

Affected Software

4 affected componentsFixes available
linux/kernel>=7.1.0<7.2.15
7.2.15
linux/kernel>=7.3.0<7.3.2
7.3.2
debian/linux<7.2.15-1
7.2.15-1
debian/linux
6.1.176-16.1.192-26.12.107-16.12.117-17.3.4-17.3.5-1

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade linux/Kernel to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 7.2.15
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade linux/Kernel to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 7.3.2
  3. Upgrade

    Upgrade debian/linux to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 7.2.15-1
  4. Upgrade

    Upgrade debian/linux to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 6.1.176-1Fixed in 6.1.192-2Fixed in 6.12.107-1Fixed in 6.12.117-1Fixed in 7.3.4-1Fixed in 7.3.5-1

Event History

Nov 19, 2026
CVE Published
via MITRE·02:45 PM
Data Sourced
via MITRE·02:45 PM
Description
Data Sourced
via OSV·02:45 PM
DescriptionAffected Software
Data Sourced
via NVD·03:18 PM
Description

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