CVE-2026-99578: wifi: rtw88: usb: route bmc frames via the high queue only for DTIM delivery

Published Nov 20, 2026
·
Updated

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: rtw88: usb: route bmc frames via the high queue only for DTIM delivery

In AP mode every broadcast and multicast data frame is routed to TXDESCQSELHIGH, the after-DTIM queue, whether or not anybody is asleep. The firmware drains that queue at beacon pace, a dozen or so frames per second measured on RTL8822BU, while one associated client's mDNS/SSDP chatter alone exceeds that. The excess accumulates inside the chip until the shared TX page pool is exhausted (measured: 14 of 1803 pages left). From that point every host-sourced frame queues behind the backlog: authentication responses reach the air seconds after the client has given up, so no station can associate anymore, and the beacon reserved-page download fails the BCNVALID poll ("error beacon valid") because it needs pages from the same pool. The AP keeps beaconing, so the failure looks like a silent RX stall and only a reboot recovers.

mac80211 already decides when after-DTIM delivery is needed: it sets IEEE80211TXCTLSENDAFTERDTIM on bmc frames only while at least one station is actually dozing. Honor that instead of routing unconditionally: flagged frames keep going through the high queue with the MOREDATA and HGQMD handling introduced by commit 076f786a0ae1 ("wifi: rtw88: Fix AP mode incorrect DTIM behavior"), everything else leaves at line rate through the AC queues. This partially reverts the usb.c hunk of that commit, whose unconditional routing is what lets the backlog build up.

On a bench AP (USB2, 20 MHz, WPA2, hostapd, a Windows client driven through disconnect/reconnect cycles): reconnects fail 0/5 on RTL8822BU and 0/3 on RTL8821CU before this change, and pass 10/10 and 5/5 with it, with the page pool staying healthy and no beacon errors logged.

Affected Software

3 affected componentsFixes available
linux/kernel<6.12.118
6.12.118
linux/kernel>=6.13.0<6.18.64
6.18.64
linux/kernel>=6.19.0<7.3.5
7.3.5

Remediation

Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.

  1. Upgrade

    Upgrade linux/Kernel to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 6.12.118
  2. Upgrade

    Upgrade linux/Kernel to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 6.18.64
  3. Upgrade

    Upgrade linux/Kernel to a version that resolves this vulnerability.

    Fixed in 7.3.5
  4. Compensating control

    In rtw88 USB AP mode, route BMC frames through the high queue only for DTIM delivery: honor IEEE80211_TX_CTL_SEND_AFTER_DTIM only while at least one station is actually dozing.

Frequently Asked Questions

1

Which deployments are exposed to this issue?

The issue affects rtw88 USB devices operating in AP mode. It is triggered by broadcast and multicast data traffic being sent through the after-DTIM queue even when no associated station is asleep.

2

Does exploitation require a sophisticated attacker?

No specific attacker action is described. Normal traffic from an associated client, such as mDNS or SSDP chatter, can exceed the firmware's beacon-paced drain rate and build the backlog.

3

What are the operational symptoms once the device reaches the failure state?

New stations may be unable to associate because authentication responses are delayed by seconds. The AP may continue beaconing while appearing to have a silent receive stall, and logs may contain an "error beacon valid" failure.

4

Is there a workaround if the affected state has already occurred?

The described failure state requires a reboot to recover. The fix is to send broadcast and multicast frames through the high, after-DTIM queue only when mac80211 marks them for after-DTIM delivery because at least one station is dozing.

Contact

SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
132 Wickham Terrace
Fortitude Valley,
QLD 4006, Australia
info@secalerts.co
By using SecAlerts services, you agree to our services end-user license agreement. This website is safeguarded by reCAPTCHA and governed by the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service. All names, logos, and brands of products are owned by their respective owners, and any usage of these names, logos, and brands for identification purposes only does not imply endorsement. If you possess any content that requires removal, please get in touch with us.
© 2026 SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
ABN: 70 645 966 203, ACN: 645 966 203