CVE-2026-99616: ovl: look up the index by the decoded origin
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovl: look up the index by the decoded origin
A file opened by file handle on an overlay with nfsexport=on can show the stale lower data of a file that was copied up to the upper layer. While the file opened this way stays in the inode cache, a lookup of the copied up file by path fails with ESTALE for all users. The open can also succeed for a file that was removed, where it has to fail with ESTALE. This happens with a handle that has one byte changed. The handle comes from an NFS client, or from a process that calls openbyhandleat() with CAPDACREADSEARCH in the initial user namespace.
When a file in a lower layer is about to be modified, overlayfs first copies it to the upper layer (copy up). With nfsexport=on, each copy up also creates an entry in the index directory, a directory that overlayfs keeps for itself on the upper filesystem.
The handle of an overlay file that comes from a lower layer wraps the handle of its lower inode. Overlayfs calls this lower inode the origin. The overlay handle stays valid after a copy up.
To decode such a handle, ovllowerfhtod() first decodes the wrapped handle to the origin. If no overlay inode is cached for the origin, it looks in the index directory:
- An index entry there leads to the upper file. - A whiteout, the marker that overlayfs uses for a removed file, means that the overlay file was removed.
The name of an index entry is the handle that copy up encoded for the origin, as a hex string.
ovllowerfhtod() builds the name for this lookup from the bytes that the caller passed in. But handles with different bytes can decode to the same inode:
- Overlayfs ignores some flag bits of the handle. - A lower filesystem can accept a different fid type, extra bytes, or generation 0 for any generation.
Such a handle decodes to the origin but misses the index entry or the whiteout. So the decode returns an overlay inode that has only the lower file.
While that inode is cached, a path lookup of a copied up file fails with ESTALE, since the upper file that the lookup finds does not match the cached inode, which has none.
Reproduced on tmpfs and on ext4 with openbyhandleat(), after a copy up and a mount cycle. A handle in which one flag bit, the fid type, the length or the generation was changed read the old lower data, and path lookups returned ESTALE.
Fix this by re-encoding the decoded origin and building the index name from that handle.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.12.118 - Upgrade
Upgrade
linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.18.64 - Upgrade
Upgrade
linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.3.5
Frequently Asked Questions
Which systems are exposed to this issue?
Systems using overlayfs with nfs_export=on are affected when lower-layer files are copied up to the upper layer. The issue involves files opened by file handle rather than ordinary path-based access.
What does an attacker or triggering client need to exploit the problem?
The triggering handle can come from an NFS client, or from a process using open_by_handle_at() with CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH in the initial user namespace. The described failure can occur when one byte of such a handle is changed.
What is the security impact of a successful trigger?
A file opened by handle can expose stale lower-layer data after the file has been copied up. It may also successfully open a file that was removed, when the operation should instead fail with ESTALE.
How might administrators recognize that they are affected?
A path lookup of a copied-up file can fail with ESTALE for all users while the file remains in the inode cache after being opened by handle. Unexpected successful handle-based opens of removed files are another described indicator.