CVE-2026-99683: vduse: fix VA/PA confusion in the coherent page fault path
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vduse: fix VA/PA confusion in the coherent page fault path
vdusedomaingetcoherentpage() assumes that iotlb entries above bouncesize were installed by vdusedomainalloccoherent(), so it treats map->addr as a physical address. But vduse registers with useva = true, and when the device is bound to vhostvdpa, vhostvdpavamap() stores a userspace virtual address in map->addr, which vdusedomainsetmap() then copies into the same iotlb. A process holding the domain file descriptor across a rebind can therefore fault in an arbitrary physical page with read/write access, ignoring the entry permissions.
Additionally, since the domain file mmap lacks VMIO, the domain file itself can be mapped and passed to vhostvdpavamap(), producing self-referential entries that bypass the coherent path check.
To fix, only translate entries whose backing file is the domain file itself in vdusedomaingetcoherentpage(), reject such entries in vdusedomainsetmap() since only external mappings should be imported, and set VMIO on the domain file mmap so vhostvdpavamap() refuses to map it in the first place.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.12.118 - Upgrade
Upgrade
linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.18.64 - Upgrade
Upgrade
linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.3.5 - Compensating control
In vduse_domain_get_coherent_page(), translate only entries backed by the domain file itself, regardless of entry permissions; reject domain-file-backed entries in vduse_domain_set_map() because only external mappings should be imported; and set VM_IO on the domain file mmap so vhost_vdpa_va_map() refuses to map it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Who is realistically exposed to this issue?
Systems using the Linux kernel vduse subsystem where a VDUSE device is bound to vhost_vdpa are exposed. Exploitation requires a process that retains the VDUSE domain file descriptor across a device rebind.
What access does an attacker need?
An attacker needs control of a process holding the VDUSE domain file descriptor and must be able to trigger mappings through the vhost_vdpa virtual-address mapping path after rebinding. The described outcome is the ability to fault arbitrary physical pages with read and write access while bypassing entry permissions.
Are default configurations affected?
The issue depends on use of VDUSE and a VDUSE device being bound to vhost_vdpa; the provided information does not establish that this configuration is enabled or reachable by default.
What mitigations are available if the fix cannot be deployed immediately?
Avoid binding VDUSE devices to vhost_vdpa, and prevent untrusted processes from retaining or using VDUSE domain file descriptors across device rebinds. These measures address the conditions described for importing virtual-address mappings into the VDUSE IOTLB.