CVE-2026-99736: mm/shmem: fix accounting of swapin-error markers
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/shmem: fix accounting of swapin-error markers
A failed swap read replaces the swap entry with a swapin-error marker in the page-cache and subtracts its pages from "alloced" and "swapped"; however, it leaves their block charge in place.
Removing the marker during truncate then subtracts from "swapped" again. This can underflow the counters or make swapped reach zero while other pages remain swapped out, causing swapoff to loop without finding them.
When installing the marker, subtract only from "swapped" and let shmemrecalcinode() reduce "alloced" and release the block charge.
Make shmemfreeswap() report successful removal separately from the number of swap pages freed, so removing a swapin-error marker does not subtract from "swapped" again.
It's a bit confusing, but replacing a swapped out page by a swapin-error marker in shmemsetfolioswapinerror() behaves as follows:
Initially: alloced=1, swapped=1, nrpages=0 Calling shmemrecalcinode(inode, 0, -1) -> swapped = 0 -> freed = 1 - 0 - 0 = 1 -> alloced -= freed -> alloced=0, swapped=0, block charge released
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.3.5
Frequently Asked Questions
What conditions are required for this issue to occur?
A shmem-backed page must be swapped out, and a subsequent swap read must fail so that the kernel installs a swapin-error marker. The accounting problem can then occur when that marker is removed during truncate.
What operational impact can this cause?
The shmem accounting counters can underflow, or the swapped counter can reach zero while pages are still swapped out. In that state, swapoff can loop because it cannot find the remaining swapped pages.
How can I tell whether a system may be affected?
Relevant symptoms include swapoff looping or failing to locate pages that remain swapped out after a swap read error. The issue specifically involves shmem accounting following failed swap reads and later marker removal.
Is there a documented mitigation if the kernel cannot be updated immediately?
No mitigation is provided in the available information. The described fix corrects kernel accounting when swapin-error markers are installed and removed.