CVE-2026-99758: sctp: account for chunk padding in sctp_init_cause()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: account for chunk padding in sctpinitcause()
sctpinitcause() accepts a chunk when skbtailroom() can hold the cause header and the payload. sctpaddtochunk() then writes 0-3 bytes of padding before that header so the chunk stays 4-byte aligned. The check does not include the padding, and the following skbput() calls skboverpanic() from softirq.
Count the padding sctpaddtochunk() is about to write. The cause length on the wire stays the header plus the payload.
Found by LLM inspection, triggered and tested the fix.
Affected Software
Remediation
Recommended actions to resolve this vulnerability, in priority order.
- Upgrade
Upgrade
linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.12.118 - Upgrade
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linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 6.18.64 - Upgrade
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linux/Kernelto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.3.5 - Upgrade
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debian/linuxto a version that resolves this vulnerability.Fixed in 7.3.5-1
Event History
Frequently Asked Questions
What conditions are required to trigger the failure?
The SCTP code must call sctp_init_cause() with tailroom sufficient for the cause header and payload but insufficient once the 0-3 bytes of alignment padding written by sctp_addto_chunk() are included. The subsequent skb_put() can then trigger skb_over_panic() in softirq context.
What is the practical impact of successful triggering?
The described result is an skb_over_panic() from softirq after an undersized tailroom check. The provided data does not establish remote reachability, required privileges, or a broader impact beyond this kernel failure condition.
How is the issue fixed?
The fix includes the alignment padding that sctp_addto_chunk() will write when checking available skb tailroom in sctp_init_cause(). The cause length sent on the wire remains the cause header plus payload and does not include the padding.